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ARTICLES 
RETHINKING COPYRIGHT’S RELATIONSHIP TO 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT† 
ALFRED C. YEN 
ABSTRACT 
This Article offers a new account of copyright’s relationship to the First 
Amendment. Until now, discourse about copyright and the First Amendment 
appears focused on applying a single standard of review. The Supreme Court 
has effectively taken the position that courts need only apply rational basis First 
Amendment scrutiny to copyright law. Some scholars have disagreed, arguing 
that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to all of copyright. By contrast, this 
Article argues that the proper level of First Amendment scrutiny depends on the 
type of copyright provision under review. In particular, courts should apply 
strict scrutiny to the few portions of the Copyright Act that embody viewpoint-
based regulation of speech, intermediate scrutiny to the more numerous 
provisions that employ content-based regulation of speech, and rational basis 
scrutiny to the Copyright Act’s content-neutral provisions. 
This suggestion draws inspiration from recent Supreme Court decisions 
applying strict scrutiny to aspects of trademark law. These cases show that basic 
free speech principles apply to intellectual property, thereby raising doubt 
about the wisdom of applying only rational basis First Amendment scrutiny to 
copyright. The Article uses these principles and insights gained from 
copyright’s historical relationship to the First Amendment to construct a 
framework that gives courts the ability to curb the use of copyright as censorship 
or naked economic giveaway while preserving Congress’s ability to implement 
appropriately reasoned copyright policies that serve the public interest. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article offers a new account of the relationship between copyright and 
the First Amendment.1 Existing orthodoxy as expressed by the Supreme Court 
maintains that conflicts between copyright and the First Amendment do not truly 
exist.2 The Court has therefore applied only lenient rational basis First 
Amendment review to copyright.3 Leading cases state that higher levels of 
scrutiny would make sense only if Congress removed two specific doctrines—
the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use—from the Copyright Act.4 This will 
probably never happen.  
Reconsideration of this orthodoxy is worthwhile because two recent Supreme 
Court cases, Matal v. Tam5 and Iancu v. Brunetti,6 appear to expose parts of 
copyright to intermediate, and even strict, scrutiny by embracing what I call 
claimant-side First Amendment challenges to intellectual property laws. These 
challenges maintain that it is unconstitutional for Congress to vary intellectual 
property protection by referring to the content of speech because doing so 
violates the general principle that the government should remain neutral in 
 
1 This relationship has been the subject of regular scholarly attention since the publication 
of two articles by Professors Paul Goldstein and Melville Nimmer in 1970. See Paul 
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. 
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and 
Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970). Other writings about the topic include Yochai 
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the 
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); Erwin Chemerinsky, Balancing Copyright 
Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act is Unconstitutional, 
36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 83 (2002); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: 
Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of Expression, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1979); 
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2001); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First 
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and 
Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use 
Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). 
2 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-60 (1985) 
(stating that doctrines like idea/expression dichotomy and fair use largely remove any tension 
between copyright and First Amendment); see also Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328-29 
(2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218-19 (2003); Arlen W. Langvardt & Tara E. 
Langvardt, Caught in the Copyright Rye: Freeing First Amendment Interests from the 
Constraints of the Traditional View, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 99, 119-20 (2011) (arguing 
that traditional views about copyright and First Amendment give relatively little weight to 
free speech concerns); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s 
Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (2002) (describing copyright as “a kind of giant First 
Amendment duty-free zone” that flouts basic free speech principles). 
3 See infra Section IV.A; see also Neil Weinstock Netanel, First Amendment Constraints 
on Copyright After Golan v. Holder, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1082, 1084 (2013). 
4 See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
5 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
6 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019). 
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matters of speech. This is significant because, up until now, First Amendment 
challenges to copyright have arisen in the context of defendants arguing that the 
enforcement of copyright violates their constitutional rights. By contrast, a 
claimant-side challenge maintains that it is the granting of copyright, not its 
enforcement, that raises constitutional trouble. This opens a largely unexplored 
perspective on copyright and the First Amendment.7 
The Supreme Court’s acceptance of claimant-side challenges upends the 
received orthodoxy about copyright and the First Amendment. In both Tam and 
Brunetti, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits Congress from 
excluding certain trademarks from registration on the basis of viewpoints 
expressed by the marks.8 By so ruling, the Court invoked its long tradition of 
using strict First Amendment scrutiny to prevent government censorship. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s commitment against censorship is so strong that it 
has applied strict scrutiny not only to viewpoint-based discrimination of the sort 
found in Tam and Brunetti but also to laws that simply use the content of speech 
to impose differential benefits and burdens without regard to viewpoint. 
Numerous cases establish that strict scrutiny renders these “content-based” 
regulations presumptively unconstitutional in a variety of contexts.9 The premise 
behind Tam and Brunetti is therefore, at least at first inspection, fully applicable 
to copyright.  
Challenging questions for copyright arise because the Copyright Act employs 
numerous content-based distinctions to vary the rights granted to copyright 
claimants. Some of these distinctions animate copyright’s basic concepts and 
policies. For example, copyright protects only original works that exhibit at least 
minimal creativity.10 Copyright therefore does not protect factual compilations 
that lack creative selection and arrangement,11 nor does it protect pictorial 
 
7 The most extensive treatment of this subject to date is Professor Ned Snow’s Content-
Based Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L.J. 1473 (2015). Snow argues that claimant-side challenges 
of the sort analyzed here would not succeed under the First Amendment and that the rational 
basis test is the primary limit on the use of content-based regulation in copyright. Id. at 1516-
17. This means that Congress has effectively unfettered discretion to use copyright to 
discriminate against various types of speech as it sees fit. See id. at 1518-19, 1521-22. I reach 
a different conclusion and believe that the First Amendment requires intermediate scrutiny of 
any content-based regulation in copyright. Accordingly, I believe that some of copyright’s 
content-based provisions are constitutional, but that others are not. 
8 See Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2297; Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1751. 
9 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 172 (2015) (holding that content-based 
regulation of signs violated First Amendment); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 
(2011) (holding that content-based restriction on sale of prescription information violated 
First Amendment); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (holding that content-based sequestering of royalties for benefit of crime 
victims violated First Amendment); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 
(1987) (holding that content-based system of differential taxation violated First Amendment). 
10 See infra Section I.A. 
11 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (holding that 
white pages were not entitled to copyright protection because they “lack[ed] the requisite 
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representations that are intended to faithfully depict existing objects.12 Similarly, 
copyright gives factual works less protection than fictional ones, primarily by 
allowing more borrowing from factual works through the fair use doctrine.13 
According to the Supreme Court, these distinctions are vital to achieving 
copyright’s purpose of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts.14 
Other content-based distinctions govern markets in copyright interests 
designed to achieve public goals. For example, copyright holders typically retain 
full control over whether anyone can make and sell recorded performances of 
their works.15 Thus, a book’s copyright holder controls whether someone can 
record a reading of the book’s text.16 However, those who own copyrights in 
songs do not enjoy similar rights. Instead, once the copyright holder of a song 
allows a person to make and sell a recording of her music, the law forces her to 
license others at no more than a statutorily prescribed rate.17 This means that 
composers enjoy less commercial control over their works than other copyright 
holders do, but this arrangement exists because Congress wanted to create 
conditions favorable to the development of mechanically reproduced music.18  
Still other distinctions appear to be nothing more than naked preferences 
arbitrarily favoring certain speech interests over others. Perhaps the best known 
of these is the differential treatment given to composers and performers when 
recorded music is performed over AM or FM radio. Despite the fact that these 
performances require the exploitation of copyrights owned by both composers 
and performers, the Copyright Act only requires that royalties be paid to the 
composer.19 No good explanation for this exists other than the naked political 
power of the analog radio broadcasting industry.20 Indeed, both composers and 
performers get royalty payments when similar performances take place over 
digital audio transmission,21 making this arrangement something that benefits an 
exceedingly narrow set of economic interests. 
 
originality”). 
12 See Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 528 F.3d 1258, 1269 (10th Cir. 
2008) (holding that digital wire models of Toyota’s cars were not entitled to copyright 
protection because models did no more than depict vehicles); Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 
F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that painting of Dorothy from The Wizard of Oz was 
not entitled to copyright protection because it was not “substantially different from the 
underlying work”). 
13 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 563 (1985). 
14 Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-50. 
15 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), (3). 
16 See id. 
17 See id. § 115. 
18 See infra notes 376-78 and accompanying text. 
19 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6). 
20 See infra notes 387-94 and accompanying text. 
21 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). 
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The ubiquity of content-based distinctions in copyright raises the possibility 
that significant portions of the existing Copyright Act violate the Constitution. 
After all, the First Amendment requires the application of strict scrutiny to 
content-based regulations of speech, copyright clearly regulates speech, and 
strict scrutiny almost always results in constitutional invalidation.22 At the same 
time, however, there are good, pragmatic reasons to be careful about jumping to 
such a conclusion. If all of copyright’s content-based provisions are indeed 
unconstitutional, chaos would surely follow. Invalidating the portions of the 
Copyright Act that define which works get copyright protection, the scope of 
copyright’s exclusive rights, and the amount that can be freely borrowed from 
copyrighted works would make it very difficult for copyright-based businesses 
as we know them to operate.  
In short, Tam and Brunetti significantly challenge how we understand the 
relationship between copyright and the First Amendment. As noted above, the 
Supreme Court has until now explained copyright’s constitutionality by 
effectively ignoring First Amendment principles considered important in other 
contexts.23 However, Tam and Brunetti show that these principles really do 
matter in intellectual property, and there is no obvious reason to exclude 
copyright from this possibility. How then should copyright’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence respond? To be sure, courts could continue to avoid applying the 
First Amendment to copyright, but Tam and Brunetti have weakened the 
justification for doing so. Accordingly, I believe that it is time to rethink 
copyright’s relationship to the First Amendment in light of the principles raised 
in Tam and Brunetti. 
In the pages that follow, I make such an effort. I conclude that it is possible 
to heed general First Amendment principles without destroying copyright as we 
know it. This conclusion rests upon the chronological enactment of Article I of 
the Constitution, the first U.S. copyright statute, and the First Amendment. 
Article I explicitly authorizes Congress to enact copyright legislation, and it 
necessarily predated the adoption of any such legislation.24 Pursuant to that 
authority, Congress passed the first copyright statute, which became effective in 
1790.25 Then, in 1791, the United States ratified the First Amendment.26  
This sequencing matters because Congress employed content-based 
regulation in the first copyright statute by granting copyright protection only to 
“any map, chart, book or books.”27 If subsequent ratification of the First 
Amendment made all forms of content-based regulation presumptively 
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny, then Congress probably exceeded its 
authority in passing the first copyright statute. Of course, that statute continued 
 
22 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015). 
23 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
25 Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124. 
26 See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). 
27 1 Stat. at 124. 
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in full force and effect, and the Supreme Court has noted this when applying the 
First Amendment to copyright.28  
This implies that the First Amendment does not require application of strict 
scrutiny to all forms of content-based regulation in copyright. Instead, it makes 
more sense to reserve presumptive unconstitutionality for only the forms of 
content-based regulation that carry the greatest risk of censorship, namely 
viewpoint-based regulation. Other content-based copyright provisions may be 
properly analyzed under intermediate scrutiny,29 with rational basis scrutiny 
applied to content-neutral portions of the Copyright Act. This three-tiered 
application of the First Amendment to copyright has the pragmatic advantage of 
avoiding chaos because copyright’s most important provisions are not 
viewpoint-based and will survive intermediate or rational basis scrutiny. 
However, this framework also applies meaningful First Amendment scrutiny to 
portions of copyright that discriminate against speech on the basis of viewpoint 
or content. This scrutiny will lead to the probable invalidation of content-based 
copyright provisions that function primarily as arbitrary or unjustified subsidies 
on behalf of some speakers over others. I contend that such constitutional 
invalidation will improve copyright. 
I make this case in five Parts. Part I describes the aspects of the Copyright Act 
that claimant-side challenges might target, namely copyright’s content-based 
provisions. Part II illustrates how claimant-side challenges would work by 
analyzing recent Supreme Court cases applying such challenges to trademark 
law. Part III provides background about First Amendment law that would be 
applied to copyright. Part IV uses this law to determine the proper amount of 
First Amendment scrutiny for various aspects of copyright law. Part V then 
applies this framework of scrutiny to copyright. It shows that copyright’s 
viewpoint-based provisions and some of its content-based subsidies probably 
fail First Amendment scrutiny, but that practically all of copyright’s core 
provisions would survive. This Article concludes with some observations about 
how First Amendment scrutiny improves copyright law. 
 
28 See Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928. 
29 Others have argued that intermediate First Amendment scrutiny should apply to 
copyright. These proposals generally argue that such scrutiny should apply to all of copyright. 
See Netanel, supra note 1, at 37; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 93. Such a position 
has much to recommend it, but it also conflicts with existing Supreme Court doctrine applying 
rational basis scrutiny to content-neutral portions of the Copyright Act. See infra notes 179-
96 and accompanying text. This creates a significant obstacle to its adoption by the courts. By 
contrast, my proposal applies different levels of scrutiny to copyright depending on the kind 
of regulation that Congress has used. And, by arguing for the application of intermediate 
scrutiny only to content-based aspects of the Copyright Act, it avoids conflict with existing 
case law. See infra notes 346-52 and accompanying text. 
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I. COPYRIGHT’S CONTENT-BASED PROVISIONS 
Copyright regulates speech. It grants statutorily enumerated exclusive rights 
to authors,30 and the prospect of commercially exploiting those rights 
encourages the creation of speech by making it profitable to create copyrighted 
works.31 If copyright encouraged all speakers equally by granting the same 
protection to all speech, it would raise few, if any, First Amendment problems. 
After all, who could object to a statute that granted equal incentives to all 
creators of speech? 
Unfortunately, copyright does not operate with this degree of neutrality. 
Instead, copyright selectively extends its benefits only to those whose speech 
meets the definition of copyrightable subject matter,32 and it denies copyright to 
those whose works borrow too much from existing works.33 This means that 
copyright picks speech winners and losers, promoting the speech that the statute 
prefers over the speech that it does not. More importantly, copyright selects its 
winners and losers by referring to the content of speech. Such content-based 
regulation is of great First Amendment significance because the Supreme Court 
generally applies strict scrutiny to such regulation, making it presumptively 
unconstitutional.34 I will discuss this significance at considerable length below. 
For now, however, it suffices to describe how thoroughly content-based 
regulation runs through copyright. Although it is not possible to analyze every 
instance of copyright’s content-based regulation, a survey of illustrations drawn 
from Chapter 1 of the Copyright Act will demonstrate the point. 
A. Content-Based Regulation in the Definition of Copyrightable Subject 
Matter 
Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act extends copyright to “original works of 
authorship.”35 This definition means that copyright separates works into two 
groups and extends the benefits of copyright to only one of them, namely 
original ones. This division depends on the content of a given work. 
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,36 the Supreme 
Court established that a factual compilation receives copyright protection if its 
 
30 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018). 
31 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991); Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 
201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant 
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
‘Science and useful Arts.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)). 
32 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
33 See id. § 103(a); Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 518 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
34 See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
35 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
36 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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selection and arrangement of facts is at least minimally creative.37 In that case, 
the Court considered a claim by Rural Telephone that Feist had committed 
copyright infringement by appropriating the contents of Rural Telephone’s 
white pages directory.38 The Court ruled for the defendant on the ground that the 
white pages contained insufficient originality to support copyright.39 The 
quantum of originality exhibited by a work need not be large, but the 
requirement is real.40 Thus, although many factual compilations exhibit enough 
originality to support copyright, the white pages did not.41 Accordingly, under 
Feist, federal courts award copyright to a factual compilation only after 
determining that its content is original.42 Similar distinctions are made for other 
types of works as well. 
For example, courts measure whether the content of drawings, paintings, and 
other visual art is original. In Gracen v. Bradford Exchange,43 the Seventh 
Circuit denied copyright to a painting based on film images of Judy Garland 
from The Wizard of Oz on the ground that such a work lacked sufficient 
originality.44 By contrast, in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc.,45 the 
Second Circuit found that hand-engraved reproductions of existing masterworks 
contained sufficient originality to support copyright.46 And, in Meshwerks, Inc. 
v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,47 the Tenth Circuit found that hand-finished 
drawings of Toyota cars lacked sufficient originality to garner copyright 
protection because they were intended to faithfully depict the appearance of 
those cars.48 
Similarly, courts justify granting copyright to blank forms by describing their 
content as original. In Bibbero Systems, Inc. v. Colwell Systems, Inc.,49 the Ninth 
Circuit explained that the plaintiff’s forms for recording medical billing 
 
37 Id. at 347-48. 
38 Id. at 343-44. 
39 Id. at 362-64. 
40 Id. at 362. 
41 Id. at 344, 364. 
42 See, e.g., Experian Info. Sols., Inc. v. Nationwide Mktg. Servs. Inc., 893 F.3d 1176, 
1184-85 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying Feist and holding that Experian’s compilation of names 
and addresses was entitled to limited copyright protection); Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. 
Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 681-82 (2d Cir. 1998) (applying Feist and holding that West’s 
compilation of court opinions was not copyrightable); Banxcorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 
978 F. Supp. 2d 280, 305-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (applying Feist and holding that Costco’s 
compilation of weekly averages was not copyrightable). 
43 698 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1983). 
44 Id. at 305. 
45 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951). 
46 Id. at 104-05. 
47 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008). 
48 Id. at 1266-68. 
49 893 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1990). 
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information lacked sufficient originality to gain copyright.50 This holding 
reflected a controversial rule denying copyright to “blank forms.”51 However, 
the court recognized that blank forms become copyrightable when appropriately 
original text is integrated with the form.52 In short, courts determine whether 
blank forms are copyrightable by determining if they contain material that courts 
deem original.53 
B. Content-Based Regulation and Exclusive Rights 
The content-based regulation of copyright extends well beyond granting 
copyright on the basis of a work’s originality. The precise rights given to a work 
also depend on its content. This content-based discrimination begins in § 106 of 
the Copyright Act, which defines the exclusive rights granted to copyright 
holders.54 Some of the exclusive rights enumerated in § 106 apply to all 
copyrighted works. Others, however, are only available to some.  
For example, the general right of public performance conspicuously does not 
protect sound recordings, extending only to “literary, musical, dramatic, and 
choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works.”55 This omission is no oversight. The right of public performance does 
protect sound recordings, but only when the performance occurs by “digital 
audio transmission.”56 This means that when recorded music is performed live 
by a DJ or over conventional analog radio, only the composer of the work being 
performed is entitled to copyright royalties. The performer, who may deserve 
considerable credit for the recording’s popularity, receives nothing.57 
Additional content-based discrimination occurs in various provisions that 
give users special rights to use certain copyrighted works. The most well-known 
of these exceptions is the fair use doctrine, codified in § 107 of the Copyright 
Act.58 Fair use excuses copying or other use of a copyrighted work that would 
otherwise constitute infringement on the basis of four factors: the purpose of the 
 
50 Id. at 1108. 
51 See id. at 1106-07; see also Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 708 (2d Cir. 
1991); Advanz Behavioral Mgmt. Res., Inc. v. Miraflor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1186 (C.D. Cal. 
1998); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(c) (2019) (denying registration to “blank forms”). 
52 Bibbero, 893 F.2d at 1106-07. 
53 See, e.g., Utopia Provider Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Med Clinical Sys., L.L.C., 596 F.3d 1313, 
1319-24 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that medical forms were not copyrightable for lack of 
originality); Kregos, 937 F.2d at 704-05. 
54 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018). 
55 Id. § 106(4). 
56 See id. § 106(6). 
57 See Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 347 F.3d 485, 487-88 (3d Cir. 2003) (describing 
how copyright protects musical compositions from unauthorized public performances while 
denying such protection to sound recordings). 
58 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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borrowing, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount of the borrowing, and 
the effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work.59  
Note that the second of these factors—the nature of the copyrighted work—
refers explicitly to the content of the work and varies the amount of free 
borrowing that users enjoy accordingly. The most common way in which this 
occurs is a distinction between factually based works and fictional ones. Users 
generally may borrow more freely from factually based works on the rationale 
that the public benefits from the broad dissemination of facts. By contrast, there 
is less need to disseminate pure fiction, making the justification for free 
borrowing weaker. Thus, fair use effectively weakens the amount of protection 
that a work gets if its content is factual in nature.60 
More content-based discrimination exists in the preamble of § 107, which 
identifies various purposes that are considered good candidates for fair use 
treatment. They include criticism, comment, news reporting, scholarship, and 
research.61 This affects the interests of potential copyright claimants by making 
it more likely that courts will declare certain forms of authorship illegal as 
copyright infringement. For example, consider an author who wants to change 
the words to a famous song for humorous effect. The creation of this new work 
might be copyright infringement, but our hypothetical author would surely 
respond to an infringement suit by claiming that her work is fair use.62 If the 
author successfully asserts fair use, then her work becomes a noninfringing 
derivative work, and the author may claim copyright in it.63 If the assertion is 
unsuccessful, then her work would be declared infringing, and the copyright 
holder of the original song would probably get an injunction against any 
distribution or other exploitation of the humorous derivative.64 Because the 
Copyright Act makes fair use more likely for works containing specific forms 
of content, it engages in content-based discrimination which advantages some 
speakers over others in the granting of copyright rights. 
 
59 See id. 
60 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994); Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“[Fair use] generally recognizes 
a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”). 
61 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
62 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 573 (describing defendants’ claims that fair use protected 
their use and adaptation of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman”). 
63 See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
64 See id. § 502(a) (permitting injunctive relief in favor of successful copyright plaintiffs); 
Jiarui Liu, Copyright Injunctions After eBay: An Empirical Study, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
215, 227-41 (2012) (showing that plaintiffs establishing copyright infringement get injunctive 
relief over ninety percent of time); see also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.06[B][1][b][i] (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2020) (ebook); Richard 
Dannay, Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter eBay — Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-
Factor Freedom?, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 449, 456 (2008). 
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Perhaps even more striking are licensing schemes found in, among other 
provisions, § 115 of the Copyright Act.65 Section 115(a) creates a compulsory 
license that applies only to nondramatic musical works, thereby limiting the 
ability of copyright holders to control the creation and distribution of recordings 
of those works.66  
Typically, the owner of a work has complete control over whether someone 
can make a recording of it. For example, § 106(1) gives copyright holders the 
right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords,” and 
§ 106(3) reserves for them the right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the 
copyrighted work to the public.”67 This means that the copyright holder of a play 
or a book completely controls whether someone can make a recording of the 
work and sell it. She can allow one person to make a recording of the work while 
refusing permission to another, or she can refuse permission to everyone. 
Section 115(a) partially deprives those owning nondramatic musical works of 
this right. It specifically states that, as to nondramatic musical works, “the 
exclusive rights provided by clauses (1) and (3) of section 106, to make and to 
distribute phonorecords of such works, are subject to compulsory licensing 
under the conditions specified by this section.”68 The section goes on to outline 
a procedure that forces copyright owners of nondramatic musical works who 
have authorized the making of one commercial recording to license others to 
make similar recordings of their works at statutorily prescribed rates.69 This 
license includes the privilege of arranging the work to conform to the style and 
interpretation of the recording artist.70 Thus, the owner of a nondramatic musical 
work can prevent her work from being altered and commercially distributed only 
by not allowing anyone to do so, even herself. For those who wish to control 
how and when the public gets recorded versions of their music, this would be a 
significant loss of economic rights. 
This Article’s final examples of content-based discrimination in the 
Copyright Act exist in § 110.71 This section contains a number of minor 
exceptions excusing behavior that would otherwise constitute infringement. 
Such exceptions might not be problematic but for the fact that they apply only 
to certain kinds of copyrighted works identified by their content. As such, they 
subject the speech expressed in those works to disfavored treatment that other 
copyrighted works do not experience. A few examples will make the point. 
 
65 See 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
66 See id. § 115(a). 
67 See id. § 106(1), (3). 
68 See id. § 115. This provision effectively codifies a similar provision found in § 1(e) of 
the 1909 Copyright Act, which governed immediately before the present 1976 Act. See 
Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, repealed by Copyright Act 
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810. 
69 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
70 See id. § 115(a)(2). 
71 Id. § 110. 
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Subsection (3) excuses the performance of nondramatic literary, musical, or 
dramatico-musical work of a religious nature in the course of religious services 
as noninfringing.72 Subsection (4) exempts certain nonprofit performances of 
nondramatic literary or musical works.73 Subsection (6) excuses performances 
of nondramatic musical works “by a governmental body or a nonprofit 
agricultural or horticultural organization, in the course of an annual agricultural 
or horticultural fair or exhibition.”74 Subsection (10) exempts performance of a 
“nondramatic literary or musical work” during private social functions 
conducted by a nonprofit veterans’ organization or a nonprofit fraternal 
organization if the proceeds from the performance go to charitable purposes.75 
Each of these exemptions may subsidize perfectly deserving organizations 
and uses, but they do so by depriving works with certain content of royalties 
enjoyed by works containing other content. Subsection (3) disfavors 
nondramatic literary, musical, and dramatico-musical work of a religious nature 
because they do not earn royalties while all other works performed in this context 
do.76 Similarly, subsection (4) disfavors nondramatic literary and musical works 
by depriving only those works of royalties for nonprofit performances.77 
Subsection (6) harms the interests of those creating nondramatic musical 
works,78 and subsection (10) does likewise to nondramatic literary or musical 
works.79  
II. CLAIMANT-SIDE CHALLENGES TO COPYRIGHT 
Tam and Brunetti illustrate how claimant-side challenges could be used to 
mount First Amendment attacks on copyright’s content-based provisions. In 
Tam, the plaintiff challenged § 2(a) of the Lanham Act,80 which denies 
registration to marks that “may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, 
institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or 
disrepute.”81 Tam sued because the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) relied 
on this provision when it refused to register the mark “The Slants” for his rock 
band.82 The PTO did so on the ground that the word “slants” is often used as a 
derogatory term for people of Asian descent.83 Tam wanted to “reclaim” the term 
 
72 Id. § 110(3). 
73 Id. § 110(4). 
74 Id. § 110(6). 
75 Id. § 110(10). 
76 See id. § 110(3). 
77 See id. § 110(4). 
78 See id. § 110(6). 
79 See id. § 110(10). 
80 Pub. L. No. 79-489, § 2(a), 60 Stat. 427, 428 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1052(a)). 
81 Id.; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751, 1754-55 (2017). 
82 Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1754. 
83 Id. 
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and give it a positive meaning by using it for his band, whose members were of 
Asian descent.84 The PTO disregarded this, and Tam sued. He won in the Federal 
Circuit, and the federal government appealed.85 
The Supreme Court affirmed.86 The Court explained that the challenged 
provision violated the First Amendment by offending a “bedrock” principle 
against banning speech because it offends.87 Here, the Lanham Act violated that 
principle by depriving Tam’s supposedly offensive mark of benefits granted to 
nondisparaging marks. Although registration is not a prerequisite for ownership 
and enforcement of trademark rights,88 registration confers important benefits.89 
Refusing to register Tam’s mark therefore disadvantaged his speech, giving rise 
to his successful First Amendment claim. 
Tam is a difficult case to read because the Court split over exactly how Tam’s 
claim should be analyzed. All eight justices agreed on the result,90 but they 
diverged over the proper standard of review. Because the Lanham Act provision 
in question was clearly a content-based regulation, strict scrutiny would 
ordinarily apply, making the law presumptively unconstitutional. However, the 
government argued that trademarks were a form of commercial speech and thus 
subject only to intermediate scrutiny.91 The government’s argument was 
plausible. After all, trademarks identify the source of a good or service being 
sold. Nevertheless, the plaintiff countered with an equally plausible argument, 
namely that trademarks often serve purposes beyond mere source designation.92 
For example, the use of “slants” in this particular context communicated a 
particular view about social issues.93  
Justice Alito spoke for himself and Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and 
Justice Thomas.94 They elected not to decide whether strict or intermediate 
scrutiny applied because the antidisparagement provision could not survive even 
intermediate scrutiny. Thus, they did not have to choose between intermediate 
and strict levels of scrutiny to decide the case.95 
 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1754-55. 
86 Id. at 1765. 
87 Id. at 1750. 
88 Id. at 1752. 
89 Id. at 1753 (explaining that registration confers benefits including constructive notice 
about ownership claims, prima facie evidence of validity, and control importation of articles 
bearing infringing mark). 
90 Justice Gorsuch did not participate. Id. at 1765. 
91 Id. at 1764. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 1751. 
95 Id. at 1764. 
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Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan.96 For them, strict scrutiny had to be applied because “[a] 
law found to discriminate based on viewpoint is an ‘egregious form of content 
discrimination,’ which is ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’”97 His opinion 
considered viewpoint discrimination so inimical to the First Amendment that 
such “heightened scrutiny” would apply even if the law regulated only 
commercial speech.98 
Finally, Justice Thomas wrote a brief concurring opinion in which he 
explained that strict scrutiny applies whenever the government tries to restrict 
truthful speech for the purpose of suppressing ideas, regardless of whether the 
speech in question is commercial or noncommercial.99 
In 2019, Brunetti elaborated on Tam to clarify the basis for the Supreme 
Court’s hostility to viewpoint-based discrimination. That case involved a First 
Amendment challenge to another portion of § 2 of the Lanham Act, which 
refused registration to immoral or scandalous marks.100 Once again, the Court 
invalidated the statutory provision in question, but this time it produced a clear 
majority opinion written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Thomas, 
Ginsburg, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.101 Justice Kagan described the many 
opinions from Tam as united by the core principle that “government may not 
discriminate against speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys.”102 
Although this language appears to state a categorical rule against viewpoint-
based discrimination, Justice Kagan cited Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
University of Virginia,103 which explained viewpoint-based discrimination as an 
“egregious form of content discrimination” that is “presumptively 
unconstitutional.”104 This implies that the Lanham Act provisions challenged in 
Tam and Brunetti failed because they could not survive strict scrutiny. 
So what do Tam and Brunetti imply for copyright? At the very least, they 
demonstrate that claimant-side challenges to viewpoint-based regulation in 
copyright would probably succeed. It is hard to imagine that the Supreme Court 
 
96 Id. at 1765 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
97 Id. at 1766 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
829-30 (1995)). 
98 Id. at 1767 (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011)). 
99 Id. at 1769 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
100 Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297 (2019). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 2299. Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor each 
concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 2294. All of them accepted the proposition that 
viewpoint-based discrimination is unacceptable, but they also thought that portions of the 
statutory provision in question did not constitute viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 2303 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); id. at 2308 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
103 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
104 Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. at 2299 (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30). 
  
1230 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1215 
would let stand, for example, a statutory provision denying copyright to any 
work that criticized the federal government. Beyond this, however, the result of 
claimant-side challenges to copyright’s content-based provisions is less clear. 
Considerable Supreme Court precedent stands for the proposition that content-
based regulation receives strict First Amendment scrutiny and that viewpoint-
based regulation is merely a form (albeit a particularly troubling one) of content-
based regulation. This case law implies that claimant-side challenges could 
succeed against not only viewpoint-based copyright provisions but also those 
that are merely content based. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court 
has never applied more than the highly deferential rational basis test when 
considering First Amendment challenges to copyright.105 This suggests that a 
proper reading of Tam and Brunetti limits strict scrutiny to copyright’s 
viewpoint-based provisions. Reconciling these possibilities begins with the 
exposition of some basic First Amendment principles. 
III. SOME FIRST AMENDMENT BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”106 Although this language sounds 
absolute, First Amendment jurisprudence actually embodies a complex (and 
sometimes incoherent) mosaic of doctrinal concepts and distinctions that control 
whether the First Amendment protects an alleged speech interest and, if so, what 
level of constitutional scrutiny follows. Of these, three are of particular interest 
to our inquiry: the distinction between speech and conduct, the level of 
constitutional scrutiny applied to content-based regulation of speech, and the 
extent of weaker First Amendment protection for commercial speech. A brief 
exposition of each and their consequences follows.  
By protecting only “freedom of speech,” the First Amendment implies that 
nonexpressive conduct receives no constitutional protection.107 Although it may 
be difficult to determine when conduct becomes sufficiently expressive to claim 
First Amendment protection,108 one common understanding of the distinction 
between speech and conduct is that government has a relatively free hand to pass 
 
105 See infra Section IV.A. 
106 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
107 See NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2373 (2018) (stating that First Amendment 
permits regulation of conduct even if such regulation imposes incidental burdens on speech); 
Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291, 300 (2007) (holding 
that state high school sports association rule prohibiting recruiting did not violate First 
Amendment because rule discouraged conduct, not speech). 
108 See Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3, 10-11 
(2016) (describing “nebulous” distinction between expression and nonexpressive conduct); 
Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication and the Freedom of “Speech,” 1993 WIS. 
L. REV. 1525, 1527; Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal 
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1277, 1346 (2005). 
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commercial regulation, even when that regulation of commercial conduct 
incidentally affects speech.109  
For example, in the seminal case of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,110 
the Supreme Court considered whether an injunction against labor picketing 
obtained under Missouri antitrust law was valid under the First Amendment.111 
Among other things, the picketers claimed that the First Amendment gave them 
the right to picket because they were “attempting peacefully to publicize truthful 
facts about a labor dispute.”112 The Supreme Court rejected this contention and 
upheld the injunction.113 The Court characterized the picketers’ speech as part 
of a concerted effort to force the target of the picketing to accept economic 
arrangements demanded by the picketers.114 According to the Court, Missouri 
was free to govern trade through its antitrust law pretty much as it saw fit.115 If 
the Court used the First Amendment to excuse the picketers’ behavior, Missouri 
would lose this power because picketers would be free to ignore Missouri law.116 
The Court therefore concluded that the First Amendment does not protect speech 
that is “an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute.”117  
As one might expect, courts apply a permissive rational basis test to laws 
affecting the verbal components of conduct when First Amendment concerns are 
minimal.118 This means that courts will find the law constitutional as long as 
 
109 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 567 (2011) (“It is true that restrictions on 
protected expression are distinct from restrictions on economic activity or, more generally, on 
nonexpressive conduct.”); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 
47, 65-67 (2006) (holding that universities refusing military recruiters access to placement 
offices because of military’s discriminatory recruitment policy engage in conduct, not 
speech); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 477 (1997) (holding that 
constitutionality of financial assessments imposed on fruit producers to support generic 
advertising is economic regulation not subject to special First Amendment scrutiny); Spence 
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam) (stating that conduct sufficiently 
“imbued with elements of communication” becomes speech protected by First Amendment); 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the view that an 
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging 
in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”). 
110 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 
111 Id. at 491-92. 
112 Id. at 498. 
113 Id. at 498-504. 
114 Id. at 492. 
115 Id. at 497. 
116 Id. at 504. 
117 Id. at 498; see also FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 425-27 
(1990) (holding boycott by lawyers seeking to raise pay of those representing indigent 
criminal defendants not insulated by First Amendment from antitrust scrutiny). 
118 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Liberty 
Coins, LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 693 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[W]here a regulatory scheme 
neither implicates a fundamental right nor creates a suspect classification, rational basis 
review applies.”); cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
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there is a rational basis for the law related to a legitimate government interest.119 
It is exceedingly rare for a law to fail rational basis scrutiny.120 
Of course, if communicative behavior rises to the level of speech, and if the 
speech does not fall into a specifically enumerated category excluded from 
protection,121 then the First Amendment generally subjects laws affecting speech 
to meaningful constitutional review.122 Such review can take the form of strict 
scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny.123  
Strict scrutiny is the most searching form of constitutional review. In order 
for a law to pass strict scrutiny, it must advance a compelling state interest and 
be narrowly tailored to that interest.124 The application of strict scrutiny nearly 
always results in a finding of unconstitutionality.125  
Intermediate scrutiny offers less searching review of a law by allowing the 
law to serve a less important government interest in a less precise manner. Courts 
typically state that intermediate scrutiny requires only that the law serve an 
important (as opposed to compelling) government interest and does so in a 
manner substantially related to the interest.126 Thus, the application of 
 
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as 
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth.”). 
119 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); City of 
New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam). 
120 See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993) (explaining that 
rational basis test accepts legislation based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence 
or empirical data); see also Maria Ponomarenko, Administrative Rationality Review, 104 VA. 
L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2018); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
747, 760 (2011) (construing rational basis review as “a free pass” that is effectively 
meaningless). 
121 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (excluding 
incitement from First Amendment protection); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492 
(1957) (excluding obscenity from First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (excluding fighting words from First Amendment 
protection). 
122 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (holding law prohibiting sale 
of prescription information regulates speech and is subject to strict scrutiny); Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding law prohibiting picketing regulates speech and is subject 
to strict scrutiny); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 
(1980) (holding ban of promotional advertising regulates commercial speech and is subject to 
intermediate scrutiny). 
123 Compare Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571 (applying strict scrutiny), with Cent. Hudson Gas, 
447 U.S. at 564 (applying intermediate scrutiny). 
124 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163-64 (2015). 
125 See, e.g., id. at 2224 (applying strict scrutiny and holding law regulating only certain 
categories of signs unconstitutional). 
126 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017); McCullen v. 
Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014). 
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intermediate scrutiny does not ordinarily result in invalidation, although such a 
result remains a real possibility.127 
The level of First Amendment scrutiny applied to government regulation of 
speech (as opposed to conduct) depends on two factors: whether the law is 
content based and whether the speech being affected is ordinary or commercial 
speech. If a law is content based, then courts apply strict scrutiny unless the 
burdened speech is commercial speech.128 Content-based regulations affecting 
only commercial speech receive intermediate scrutiny, as do regulations that are 
not content based (i.e., are content neutral).129 
Content-based regulations are those that impose differing burdens on speech 
depending on its content.130 Examples of content-based regulations include those 
that criminalize depictions of animal cruelty131 or those that impose different 
restrictions on political, religious, directional, and commercial street signs.132 To 
understand why content-based regulation receives strict scrutiny, let us begin by 
considering the starkest example of content-based regulation, namely viewpoint-
based regulation. 
Examples of viewpoint-based regulation include the prohibition of picketing 
near a foreign embassy when the picketers criticize the embassy’s government133 
or the denial of funding to student groups that promote “a particular belie[f] in 
or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”134 Laws like this differ from ordinary 
content-based regulation because they refer to the intellectual position of the 
speaker as opposed to the subject matter or general nature of her speech. 
Viewpoint-based regulation generally imposes a form of censorship because it 
implies governmental suppression of certain ideas in favor of others, and this is 
 
127 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 430 (2002) 
(plurality opinion); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986). 
128 See NIFLA v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018); Reed, 576 U.S. at 163; Sorrell, 
564 U.S. at 571 (“[I]t is all but dispositive to conclude that a law is content based . . . .”); see 
also infra notes 143-65 and accompanying text (discussing regulation of commercial speech). 
129 Laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas 
or views expressed are in most instances content neutral. See, e.g., Members of the City 
Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for 
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981). 
130 See Reed, 576 U.S. at 163. 
131 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010). 
132 Reed, 576 U.S. at 169-72 (holding Town code that restricted posting of temporary 
directional signs was content based and impermissible); see also Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (holding restriction against violent video games was content 
based and impermissible); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (holding bans on 
residential picketing unless for labor were content based and impermissible). 
133 Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331 (1988). 
134 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 823 (1995) (alteration 
in original). 
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why the Supreme Court has stated that viewpoint-based discrimination clearly 
violates the First Amendment.135  
This link between censorship and certain forms of content-based regulation 
has led the Supreme Court to apply strict scrutiny to more than viewpoint-based 
regulation. Because censorship constitutes a particularly odious form of 
government behavior, the Court has not considered the prohibition of only 
viewpoint-based regulation sufficient to ensure that censorship will not occur. 
This is because government can easily use ordinary content-based regulation to 
accomplish censorship even if censorship did not necessarily motivate 
enactment of the regulation in question. Consider, for example, a law that 
prohibits picketing unless conducted for purposes of a labor dispute. Such a law 
might not have been passed for the purpose of favoring one type of speech over 
others, but it clearly has that effect.136 Accordingly, First Amendment doctrine 
generally lumps ordinary content-based regulation with viewpoint-based 
discrimination by applying strict scrutiny to both.137 As the Supreme Court has 
explained: 
Innocent motives do not eliminate the danger of censorship presented by a 
facially content-based statute, as future government officials may one day 
wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech. That is why the First 
Amendment expressly targets the operation of the laws—i.e., the 
“abridg[ement] of speech”—rather than merely the motives of those who 
enacted them. “‘The vice of content-based legislation . . . is not that it is 
always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself 
to use for those purposes.’”138 
The major exception to the application of strict scrutiny to content-based 
regulation is the so-called commercial speech doctrine, which provides that 
content-based regulation of commercial speech receives only intermediate 
scrutiny.139 According to the Supreme Court, commercial speech is “speech 
proposing a commercial transaction”140 or “expression related solely to the 
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.”141 However, courts have 
found it challenging to clearly identify commercial speech because apparent 
commercial speech often contains artistic, political, or informative components 
 
135 See Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2019); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829. 
136 See Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 94 (1972) (holding that law prohibiting 
picketing near schools unless connected to labor dispute involving schools violates First 
Amendment). 
137 See id. at 95. For further discussion of cases applying strict scrutiny to ordinary content-
based regulation not motivated by censorship, see infra Section IV.B. 
138 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 167 (2015) (alterations in original) (citation 
omitted) (first quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I; and then quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 
703, 743 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
139 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
140 Id. at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)). 
141 Id. at 561. 
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that would appear to merit full First Amendment protection.142 It therefore 
makes sense to review some leading cases to get a better sense of why this 
doctrine exists. 
In Valentine v. Chrestensen,143 plaintiff Chrestensen owned a submarine that 
he exhibited for profit.144 He brought the vessel to New York City, docked it, 
and attempted to distribute flyers advertising the attraction on the streets.145 The 
Police Commissioner of New York City told Chrestensen that distributing his 
flyers violated a city ordinance that prohibited street distribution of 
advertisements.146 Chrestensen responded by creating a double-sided handbill 
that had an advertisement for the submarine on one side and a protest about the 
City’s behavior on the other.147 The City advised Chrestensen that he could 
distribute his protest but that he could not do so with the advertisement printed 
on the other side of the handbill.148 Chrestensen refused to comply and was 
restrained by the police.149 Chrestensen then sued and received an injunction 
allowing him to distribute the handbills.150 The Circuit Court affirmed, but the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.151 
In so ruling, the Court found that the First Amendment restricted 
government’s power to regulate speech expressed in the streets. However, the 
Court made an exception for “purely commercial advertising,”152 stating that the 
First Amendment did not protect that type of speech.153 Importantly, the Court 
refused to give weight to the protests contained on one side of Chrestensen’s 
handbills because doing so would make it impossible for government to regulate 
advertisements. As the Court wrote: “If that evasion were successful, every 
merchant who desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets need only 
 
142 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 419 (1993) 
(describing how case about forbidding use of newsracks to distribute commercial publications 
“illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech”); 
see also Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 
5 (2000) (describing “blurred” boundaries of commercial speech); Kathryn E. Gilbert, Note, 
Commercial Speech in Crisis: Crisis Pregnancy Center Regulations and Definitions of 
Commercial Speech, 111 MICH. L. REV. 591, 595-97 (2013) ( “Commercial speech doctrine 
is a mess.”). 
143 316 U.S. 52 (1942). 
144 Id. at 52. 
145 Id. at 52-53. 
146 Id. at 53. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 54. 
151 Id. at 54-55. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
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append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the law’s 
command.”154 
Chrestensen illustrates a problem that has defied clear solution. The 
government has and needs the ability to regulate commerce without undue 
judicial interference. However, commerce frequently involves speech. If the 
First Amendment prohibits government regulation of commerce whenever that 
regulation affects speech, then clever businesses can evade government 
regulation by deliberately conducting business intermingled with speech. Thus, 
if government is to retain its ability to regulate commerce, courts must limit 
application of ordinary First Amendment protection when speech involves 
commerce.155 
Chrestensen’s complete denial of First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech did not last forever. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,156 the Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council sued to invalidate a law preventing pharmacists from advertising 
prescription drug prices.157 Not surprisingly, the defendants cited Chrestensen 
for the proposition that commercial advertisement received no First Amendment 
protection.158 The Court rejected this argument and extended First Amendment 
protection to commercial speech, including speech that does “no more than 
propose a commercial transaction.”159 The Court made it clear that such 
protection did not prevent regulation, or even prohibition, of some forms of 
commercial speech, such as false speech.160 In this case, however, Virginia did 
not have adequate reasons for completely suppressing truthful information about 
lawful activity to pass First Amendment scrutiny.161 
The Court further clarified this approach to commercial speech in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.162 In that case, 
Central Hudson challenged a state regulatory decree forbidding promotional 
advertising by electric utilities.163 The Court struck down the regulation and 
affirmed its position that the First Amendment protects commercial speech. 
 
154 Id. at 55. 
155 See Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 148 (recognizing 
debate around whether subordination of commercial speech to other speech was sufficient “to 
ensure that the First Amendment would not paralyze the operation of the modern state”). 
156 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
157 Id. at 752. 
158 Id. at 758. 
159 Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
160 Id. at 770-73 (listing time, place, and manner restrictions, restrictions against false and 
misleading advertising, and restrictions on electronic broadcast media as likely permissible 
restrictions). 
161 Id. at 773. 
162 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
163 Id. at 558-59. 
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However, the Court clearly stated that commercial speech receives lower First 
Amendment protection than other types of speech.164 This meant that the First 
Amendment accepts government regulation of lawful, nonmisleading 
commercial speech if: (1) the government asserts a substantial interest; (2) the 
regulation directly advances the government interest; and (3) the regulation is 
not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.165 
Together, Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson establish an 
approach to commercial speech that is radically different from the one taken in 
Chrestensen. Instead of giving government a free hand to regulate commerce, 
even when speech is involved, the Court established the First Amendment as a 
meaningful source of reviewing—and potentially invalidating—commercial 
regulation. Granted, content-based regulations of commercial speech are not 
presumptively invalid. Nevertheless, the government can no longer rely on 
lenient rational basis review to uphold restrictions on commercial speech. 
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT REVIEW OF COPYRIGHT’S CONTENT-BASED 
PROVISIONS 
First Amendment doctrine plausibly supports using rational basis scrutiny, 
intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny for First Amendment review of 
copyright’s regulation of speech. Each possibility corresponds to a different 
characterization of copyright’s relationship to speech. If courts consider 
copyright a form of commercial regulation affecting conduct, then rational basis 
review makes sense for most (if not all) of copyright. If courts view copyright 
as the direct regulation of speech, then strict scrutiny would apply to copyright’s 
content-based provisions and intermediate scrutiny to copyright’s content-
neutral ones. Finally, if courts think of copyright as both commercial regulation 
and speech regulation, applying intermediate scrutiny to all of copyright would 
follow. 
This Part examines the law supporting each of these possibilities in more 
detail in hopes of figuring out how the First Amendment should affect copyright. 
Not surprisingly, support exists for each possibility but not enough to create a 
seamless regime of review. Indeed, all three methods of review have roles to 
play in the proper First Amendment review of copyright. 
A. The Case for Rational Basis Review 
The Supreme Court has consistently applied rational basis First Amendment 
review to copyright. The relevant cases involve First Amendment challenges by 
copyright users as opposed to claimants, and the Court has offered two reasons 
for using the rational basis test. First, although copyright may restrict people 
from making use of copyrighted works, any effect on speech is minimized 
 
164 Id. at 562-63 (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial 
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”). 
165 Id. at 566. 
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because copyright contains doctrines—like the idea/expression dichotomy and 
fair use—that give individuals the right to make appropriate use of copyrighted 
works. Second, any remaining speech losses are outweighed by the creation of 
new works that copyright makes possible.166 
The underpinnings for this position come from Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.167 In that case, defendant Nation Enterprises 
clandestinely received a pre-publication copy of President Gerald Ford’s 
memoir A Time to Heal.168 The Nation Magazine wrote and published an article 
that summarized the memoir and quoted some of its passages.169 Harper & Row 
sued, alleging that this article infringed copyright in President Ford’s memoir.170 
Nation Enterprises defended on the basis of fair use.171 
In asserting this defense, Nation Enterprises did not ask the Court to review 
the constitutionality of any Copyright Act provisions. Instead, it argued that the 
First Amendment required generous, pro-defendant fair use treatment because 
President Ford’s unique public position gave his memoirs unusual importance 
as a matter of public interest.172 The Court rejected this idea, declining to “create 
what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.”173  
In so ruling, the Court asserted that the idea/expression dichotomy strikes an 
appropriate balance between guarantees of free speech and incentives for the 
creation of new speech.174 Copyright leaves ideas and facts unprotected so that 
people can borrow and communicate them freely.175 Yet, at the same time, 
copyright encourages the creation of new speech by protecting the expression of 
 
166 For purposes of this Article, I accept these justifications as valid. However, it is 
important to note that both assertions are problematic and may not support the Court’s 
reasoning well. This is because neither the idea/expression dichotomy nor the fair use doctrine 
necessarily provide firm guarantees of any particular level of free borrowing from copyrighted 
works. Seminal cases invoking both doctrines candidly admit that the doctrines are murky. 
The idea/expression dichotomy may allow free borrowing of a work’s ideas, but it is 
impossible to define whether any given portion of a work is idea or expression. See Nichols 
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). The fair use doctrine excuses 
certain borrowings on the basis of a four-factor test, but consistent interpretation of those 
factors eludes the courts. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 
(1994). Accordingly, as a descriptive matter, courts have interpreted both doctrines to permit 
generous levels of borrowing or very little borrowing. Such ambiguity implies that neither 
doctrine truly provides an adequate guarantee of free speech. See Joseph P. Bauer, Copyright 
and the First Amendment: Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?, 67 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 831, 847-61 (2010); Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 13-21; Tushnet, supra note 1, at 548. 
167 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
168 Id. at 543. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 544. 
172 Id. at 555-56. 
173 Id. at 560. 
174 Id. at 556; see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018) (denying copyright protection for ideas). 
175 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556. 
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authors and allowing them to reap economic rewards from the exploitation of 
their works.176 Indeed, without such protection, authors might not create new 
works at all, thereby reducing speech.177 This led to the conclusion that the case 
at hand did not merit a specific interpretation of fair use for First Amendment 
reasons, and the Court ruled against the defendant.178 
Eldred v. Ashcroft179 elaborated on Harper to apply rational basis First 
Amendment scrutiny to copyright legislation.180 In Eldred, the plaintiff argued 
(among other things) that the First Amendment required heightened scrutiny of 
new copyright legislation that added twenty years to the term of already existing 
copyrights.181 The Court disagreed. Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion cited 
Harper for the proposition that copyright’s role as “the engine of free 
expression” rendered it basically compatible with the First Amendment.182 
Granted, copyright made it illegal for some people to engage in their desired 
speech activities. However, these restrictions had relatively little significance 
because the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use guaranteed users 
considerable ability to borrow from copyrighted works.183 Thus, copyright’s 
pro-speech incentives outweighed its anti-speech restrictions, so intermediate 
scrutiny was unnecessary. The Court could review copyright under the rational 
basis test as long as Congress did not alter “the traditional contours of copyright 
protection.”184 
Eldred’s elaboration of Harper implies that First Amendment review of new 
copyright legislation depends on how the legislation affects copyright as a 
whole. If new legislation maintains copyright’s traditional contours, then the 
rational basis test applies. If new legislation changes those contours, then 
intermediate or strict scrutiny becomes possible. This obviously places great 
importance on the meaning of copyright’s “traditional contours,” but the Eldred 
Court did not identify them. However, the Supreme Court did further elaborate 
in Golan v. Holder.185 
In Golan, the plaintiffs were conductors, musicians, and publishers who 
challenged legislation that removed certain works that had never gained or had 
 
176 See id. at 556-57. 
177 See id. at 559. 
178 Id. at 560. 
179 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
180 Id. at 204-05. 
181 Id. at 217-18. The plaintiff also made other arguments about the extent of congressional 
power under Article I, but they are not relevant to this Article’s investigation. 
182 Id. at 219 (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558). 
183 Id. at 219-20. 
184 Id. at 221; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (explaining that idea/expression 
dichotomy and fair use doctrine obviate the need for First Amendment-based de facto 
exceptions to copyright). 
185 565 U.S. 302 (2012). 
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lost American copyright protection from the public domain.186 The plaintiffs 
argued that, among other things, the First Amendment prohibited Congress from 
removing works from the public domain.187 The District Court summarily 
rejected this argument on the ground that enforcement of copyright does not 
implicate First Amendment concerns.188 However, the Tenth Circuit disagreed 
because, according to the court, the legislation altered the traditional contours of 
copyright.189 This made meaningful constitutional scrutiny necessary, and the 
Tenth Circuit remanded to the District Court.190 
On remand, the District Court found that the legislation was content-neutral 
regulation of speech and applied intermediate scrutiny.191 The court concluded 
that the statute could not survive this scrutiny because it was not justified by any 
asserted federal interests.192 The Tenth Circuit once again disagreed, finding that 
the law was narrowly tailored to fit the purpose of protecting U.S. copyright 
holders’ interests abroad.193 The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari and affirmed, citing Eldred.194 In so doing, the Court identified 
copyright’s traditional contours as the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair 
use doctrine.195 Because the law in question left those two doctrines undisturbed, 
no elevated scrutiny was necessary or appropriate.196 
It is possible to read Harper, Eldred, and Golan as a definitive statement 
effectively limiting all First Amendment review of copyright to the rational basis 
test. This rests on the Supreme Court’s apparent belief that rational basis review 
applies to any piece of copyright legislation as long as it does not weaken the 
idea/expression dichotomy or the fair use doctrine.197 However, such a 
conclusion is overbroad and unwarranted.  
As an initial matter, Eldred and Golan applied the First Amendment only to 
content-neutral aspects of the Copyright Act. The Court did not have to rule on 
copyright’s general obligation of content neutrality, leaving the proper standard 
for reviewing content-based portions of copyright technically undecided. 
Additionally, the rationale of Eldred and Golan works only when applied to 
traditional First Amendment claims about copyright—namely, claims brought 
 
186 Id. at 307-08, 313-14. 
187 Golan v. Gonzales, No. 01-cv-01854, 2005 WL 914754, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2005). 
188 Id. at *14. 
189 Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187-89 (10th Cir. 2007). 
190 Id. at 1196-97. 
191 Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170-71, 1177 (D. Colo. 2009). 
192 Id. at 1177. 
193 Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 2010). 
194 Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 319 (2012). 
195 Id. at 328-29. 
196 Id. 
197 See Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Copyright Under Siege: The First Amendment Front, 9 
COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 41, 42 (2004) (taking position that Eldred correctly rejects 
practically all First Amendment challenges to copyright). 
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by users. In those cases, the Supreme Court implied that without copyright, 
society would have far fewer creative works to enjoy. Because doctrines like the 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use keep the free speech losses suffered by 
users relatively low,198 the benefits of new works incentivized by copyright 
outweigh any First Amendment losses copyright imposes.199 In short, the Court 
seems to believe that, although copyright takes away some free use of 
copyrighted materials, users and society are still better off because they have 
(albeit slightly lower) access to a larger number of works. 
By contrast, when a copyright claimant brings a First Amendment claim, she 
will argue that she is entitled to more protection than the copyright statute 
gives.200 The idea/expression dichotomy and fair use may minimize free speech 
losses suffered by copyright users, but they do not have the same effect on 
copyright claimants. Indeed, because those doctrines give users the right to 
borrow parts of copyrighted works, they appear to harm the speech interests of 
copyright claimants by curtailing rights that copyright holders might otherwise 
enjoy. Moreover, to the extent that copyright incentives for new works 
compensate society and users for speech losses that copyright inflicts, those 
incentives do not meaningfully alleviate losses experienced by copyright 
claimants. A plaintiff claiming that she has been unconstitutionally deprived of 
a copyright right gains no solace from the fact that others enjoy those incentives 
to create copyrightable works.201 
The foregoing shows that at most one should read Eldred and Golan as 
establishing rational basis review only for First Amendment claims brought by 
users of copyrighted works against content-neutral provisions of the Copyright 
Act. This further implies that other cases applying the First Amendment to 
content-based regulation have much to say about the proper review of 
copyright’s content-based provisions.  
B. The Case for Strict Scrutiny 
No case has applied strict First Amendment scrutiny to copyright. However, 
as shown below, the Supreme Court has used such scrutiny to strike down laws 
that selectively diminished the value of some copyrights on the basis of content. 
Together, these cases suggest that strict scrutiny should be applied to copyright’s 
content-based provisions.202 
 
198 See Golan, 565 U.S. at 327-28 (describing First Amendment protection offered by 
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use as critically important); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186, 219 (2003) (rejecting elevated scrutiny “on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own 
speech-protective purposes and safeguards”). 
199 Golan, 565 U.S. at 328; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219. 
200 See supra Part II. 
201 See Snow, supra note 7, at 1502 (arguing that denial of copyright rights does not 
prevent speech from occurring and instead only denies the derivation of profit benefit to the 
claimant). 
202 See Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 5 (characterizing copyright as content-based regulation 
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In Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland,203 the publisher of a general 
interest magazine sued over Arkansas’s sales tax scheme, which imposed a tax 
on general interest magazines while exempting newspapers and religious, 
professional, trade, and sports journals.204 Not surprisingly, the state defended 
on the ground that a sales tax constitutes ordinary commercial regulation that the 
state could shape as it saw fit.205 The Supreme Court disagreed because the 
taxing scheme varied tax rates on the basis of the magazines’ content.206 The 
Court understood that the tax did not constitute viewpoint discrimination and 
that the state lacked censorial motives.207 Nevertheless, the content-based nature 
of the tax required strict scrutiny because selective taxation of the press could 
easily be abused.208 The state argued that its differential tax could survive strict 
scrutiny on the ground that it was designed to help encourage “fledgling” 
publishers.209 However, the Court expressed skepticism that such a justification 
would be compelling.210 Furthermore, even if this proposed interest were 
compelling, the differential tax was not narrowly drawn by reason of being both 
over- and underinclusive.211  
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Board,212 a book publisher sued to invalidate New York’s so-called “Son of 
Sam” law.213 That law required the deposit of income from works describing a 
convicted criminal’s crime into an escrow account for the benefit of the 
criminal’s victims and creditors.214 The Court struck the law down, writing: “A 
statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a 
financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.”215 Because 
the Son of Sam law applied only to certain types of works, it was a content-based 
regulation that had to pass strict scrutiny.216 New York asserted, among other 
things, that the law served the compelling state interest of compensating victims 
 
that should be, at least as a matter of basic principle, subject to strict scrutiny); Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 
Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 703-10 (2003) (arguing that certain 
copyright provisions should be treated as content based). 
203 481 U.S. 221 (1987). 
204 Id. at 223. 
205 Id. at 228-29. 
206 Id. at 229. 
207 Id. at 230. 
208 Id. at 228 (“[S]elective taxation of the press . . . poses a particular danger of abuse by 
the State.”). 
209 Id. at 232. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
213 Id. at 108. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 115. 
216 Id. at 116. 
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of crime.217 The Court accepted that interest as compelling but still found the 
law unconstitutional because it was both over- and underinclusive.218 
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,219 the Court considered claims by data miners 
and pharmaceutical companies that a Vermont law prohibiting the sale for 
marketing purposes of data about prescriptions written by physicians violated 
the First Amendment.220 This information had value because pharmaceutical 
companies that knew the prescriptions written by a particular physician could 
use that knowledge to market their drugs to that physician.221 Pharmacies had 
this information because they processed prescriptions written by physicians.222 
Pharmacies then sold their information to data miners, who in turn leased it to 
pharmaceutical companies.223 Vermont decided to prohibit this practice in order 
to protect medical privacy and the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship, 
and it justified the law as commercial regulation with minimal speech effects.224 
The Court disagreed, finding that the law burdened speech on the basis of its 
content.225 The Court explained that the statute in question facially singled out 
marketing for suppression while exempting other speech from regulation.226 It 
likened this result to laws banning the sale of “cookbooks, laboratory results, or 
train schedules.”227 This exposed the law to strict scrutiny and ultimate 
invalidation.228  
Arkansas Writers’ Project, Simon & Schuster, and Sorrell show that the 
Supreme Court will apply strict scrutiny to invalidate content-based regulation 
that differentially affects copyright-related interests. Because Eldred and 
Golan’s application of the rational basis test is truly established only for 
copyright’s content-neutral provisions, Arkansas Writers’ Project, Simon & 
Schuster, and Sorrell strongly imply that strict scrutiny should apply to 
copyright’s content-based provisions. There are, of course, some wrinkles that 
need to be further considered before accepting this conclusion. 
 
217 Id. 115-16 (“A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it 
imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.”). 
218 Id. at 118-23. 
219 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
220 Id. at 557. 
221 Id. at 557-58. 
222 Id. at 558. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 566, 572. 
225 Id. at 563-66. 
226 Id. at 563-64. 
227 Id. at 570. 
228 Id. at 571. 
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1. Copyright Does Not Really Employ Content-Based Regulation 
It is possible to argue that some of copyright’s disparate treatment of speech 
is not content-based regulation.229 Those taking this position might contend that 
copyright has the benign purpose of encouraging speech and therefore does not 
pose a significant risk to free speech values.230 However, I believe that such an 
argument pays insufficient attention to case law stating that a benign purpose 
neither converts a facially content-based statute into a content-neutral one nor 
sufficiently appreciates the threats copyright can pose to free speech.  
The argument against treating copyright as content-based regulation draws 
support from cases implying that laws are content based only when the 
government adopts them for the explicit purpose of preventing the dissemination 
of the speech in question. Perhaps the most prominent of these cases is City of 
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.231 In that case, the Supreme Court chose not 
to treat as content based a city ordinance subjecting adult entertainment to less 
favorable zoning than other forms of entertainment.232 The Court explained that 
although the ordinance did refer to the content of the entertainment in question, 
the city did not adopt the ordinance for the purpose of preventing the 
dissemination of adult entertainment.233 Instead, the city hoped to alleviate 
problems like crime or litter that were associated with adult entertainment.234 
This implied that apparently content-based regulation could escape strict 
scrutiny if government adopted the regulation for reasons other than preventing 
dissemination of the speech in question. 
Additionally, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism,235 the Supreme Court 
considered whether a New York City regulation that required rock bands to use 
a city-provided sound system and technician violated the First Amendment.236 
The Court held that the law was constitutional, rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that 
the law gave control of aesthetic decisions to city officials.237 In so ruling, the 
 
229 This question is, not surprisingly, a matter of academic debate. For a sample of those 
arguing that copyright is not content-based regulation, see Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 93-
94; David McGowan, Why the First Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 281, 294-96 (2004); Netanel, supra note 1, at 6. It should be noted, however, that the 
conclusion that copyright is content neutral does not lead all of these scholars to argue for 
rational basis First Amendment scrutiny. Instead, some argue that copyright should be 
generally subject to intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 1, at 6. For those who 
see copyright as content-based regulation, see Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 5; Volokh, supra 
note 202, at 703-10; see also C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 891, 939 (2002); Lemley & Volokh, supra note 1, at 165-69. 
230 See Netanel, supra note 1, at 47-49; see also McGowan, supra note 229, at 295. 
231 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
232 Id. at 46-49. 
233 Id. at 47-48. 
234 Id. 
235 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
236 Id. at 784. 
237 Id. at 790-91. 
  
2020] RETHINKING COPYRIGHT’S RELATIONSHIP 1245 
Court wrote that identifying content-based laws revolved around determining 
“whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of 
disagreement with the message it conveys.”238 
Finally, in Texas v. Johnson,239 the Court struck down a Texas statute that 
criminalized desecration of “a venerated object.”240 The state prosecuted 
Johnson under this law for burning an American flag, and Johnson defended on 
free speech grounds.241 In ruling for Johnson, the Court chose to treat the statute 
as a content-based regulation of speech, even though the statute did not specify 
the content of speech to be regulated.242 The Court explained that Johnson’s 
conviction “depended on the likely communicative impact of his expressive 
conduct,” effectively making his prosecution depend on the content of his 
speech.243 
Although Renton, Ward, and Johnson indicate that content neutrality exists 
when government lacks censorial motives, their invocation does not make 
copyright a content-neutral regulation. As an initial matter, neither Ward nor 
Johnson used this rationale to explain why a facially content-based regulation 
was actually content neutral. Instead, those cases considered whether a facially 
content-neutral regulation might become content based because the government 
had improper motives.244 And, although Renton characterized a facially content-
based statute as content neutral, its reasoning has never been applied other than 
in the context of sexually explicit entertainment.245 Even if one were to apply 
Renton outside the context of sexually explicit entertainment, the reasons for 
copyright’s content-based provisions differ considerably from the reasons 
identified for Renton’s zoning of adult entertainment. 
In Renton, the city adopted the law in question in order to minimize social ills 
unrelated to sexually explicit entertainment. The Court explained that “the 
Renton ordinance is aimed not at the content of the films shown at ‘adult motion 
picture theatres,’ but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the 
surrounding community.”246 The Renton law could therefore be justified 
“without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”247 This 
 
238 Id. at 791. 
239 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
240 Id. at 400. 
241 Id. at 399-400. 
242 Id. at 412. 
243 Id. at 411-12. 
244 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92 (1989); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406-
08. 
245 See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 825 F.3d 149, 163 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court has never actually applied the secondary effects doctrine outside the realm of 
brick-and-mortar purveyors of adult sexually explicit content.”). 
246 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986). 
247 Id. at 48 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). 
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characterization does not apply to copyright’s content-based provisions; instead, 
the content of the speech being regulated explains why the law discriminates 
between different types of speech. Copyright protects only original works 
because that is the kind of speech government wants to promote.248 Copyright 
permits more generous borrowing from factual works than fictional works in the 
belief that such borrowing is of particular importance to future authors.249 
Compulsory licenses for the production of recorded music exist because 
Congress worried about monopolization in one area of expression but not 
others.250 It is therefore impossible to describe copyright as regulation of 
something other than speech; it is the direct regulation of speech.251  
Most importantly of all, the Supreme Court has regularly and clearly stated 
that simply referring to the content of speech in order to impose differential 
regulation is enough to trigger strict scrutiny, even when government motives 
are benign.252 Reed v. Town of Gilbert253 offers a recent and strong example. In 
Reed, the town of Gilbert, Arizona enacted a code regulating the types of signs 
that could be displayed outdoors.254 That code prohibited the display of outdoor 
signs without a permit, but it gave exemptions to twenty-three categories of 
signs.255 “Ideological Sign[s]” received the most favorable treatment because 
 
248 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-49 (1991) (describing 
originality as a constitutional requirement that promotes copyright’s primary objective of 
promoting progress of science and art). 
249 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (finding some 
works more subject to fair use treatment, such as factual works over fictional stories); Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“The law generally 
recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.”). 
250 See infra notes 376-78 and accompanying text. 
251 For other scholarly expressions of doubt about using Renton and its secondary effects 
reasoning to insulate copyright from First Amendment review, see Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the Supreme 
Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 59-61 (2000) (criticizing Renton as 
“objectionable” because it allows courts to characterize content-based laws as content 
neutral); Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 6 n.18 (expressing opinion that Renton’s logic does not 
apply to copyright and that Renton is, “in any event, an analytical embarrassment”); Volokh, 
supra note 202, at 705-06 (stating that Renton test has been “heavily” and “aptly” criticized, 
and expressing hope that it is not extended beyond zoning of adult businesses). 
252 For cases stating that motive does not matter to a determination that a law is content 
based, see City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429-30 (1993) 
(rejecting application of Renton and holding that city prohibition against distribution of 
“commercial handbills” on public property is content-based regulation regardless of city’s 
motive); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 
117 (1991) (holding that no evidence of improper censorial motive is needed to establish 
content-based regulation and justify application of strict scrutiny); Minneapolis Star & 
Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) (holding that “illicit 
legislative intent” not required for finding of First Amendment violation). 
253 576 U.S. 155 (2015). 
254 Id. at 159. 
255 Id. 
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they could be placed anywhere in town and could be as large as twenty square 
feet.256 “Political Sign[s]” received somewhat less favorable treatment. They 
could be displayed only during a period from sixty days before to fifteen days 
after a general election and could not be larger than thirty-two square feet.257 
“Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event” received even 
less favorable treatment. They could be no larger than six square feet and could 
be displayed no more than twelve hours before and one hour after the event in 
question.258 
Reed was the pastor of a church whose temporary directional signs were 
sometimes left on display beyond the relevant time limits.259 When Reed and his 
church were unable to reach accommodation with Gilbert, they sued, claiming 
violation of their First Amendment rights.260 They lost in the District Court and 
the Ninth Circuit on the ground that the town did not engage in content-based 
discrimination.261 This determination rested in part on a finding that Gilbert did 
not adopt its regulation to disadvantage speech with which it did not agree.262 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.263 The Court held that the sign law 
was indeed content based because it applied different regulations to signs 
depending on the messages conveyed.264 Importantly, the Court rejected the 
argument that benign motives could transform laws that are facially content 
based into content-neutral ones.265 Justice Thomas’s opinion emphasized the 
concern that seemingly benign content-based laws could easily be subverted into 
censorship. He wrote that “[i]nnocent motives do not eliminate the danger of 
censorship presented by a facially content-based statute, as future government 
officials may one day wield such statutes to suppress disfavored speech.”266 
Accordingly, “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny 
regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or 
lack of ‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”267 
 
256 Id. (alteration in original). 
257 Id. at 160. 
258 Id. at 160-61. 
259 Id. at 161. 
260 Id. at 162. 
261 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1070-72 (9th Cir. 2013); Reed v. Town of 
Gilbert, 832 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077-78 (D. Ariz. 2011). 
262 Reed, 707 F.3d at 1072. 
263 Justice Thomas wrote for the Court, with Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Breyer 
concurring only in the judgment. Reed, 576 U.S. at 174. Justice Alito wrote a concurring 
opinion joined by Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor, in which all three Justices joined the 
Court’s opinion. Id. 
264 Id. at 164. 
265 Id. at 163-66. 
266 Id. at 167. 
267 Id. at 165 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 
(1993)). 
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Cases like Reed make it very difficult to treat copyright as benign regulation 
subject only to rational basis review. Granted, Eldred did find that copyright has 
speech protective doctrines that minimize its effect on speech, making copyright 
commercial regulation subject to the rational basis test. However, it is the 
possibility that government could misuse seemingly benign laws that makes 
facially content-based laws presumptively unconstitutional. And indeed, 
government could easily turn copyright towards censorial purposes.  
 For example, consider the argument that copyright is not content based 
because distinctions between music and literature do not implicate the content 
of works, but merely the form of expression. Although it may be true that 
government presently has no particular reason to favor written expression over 
musical expression, this state of affairs does not have to persist. 
Music, dance, and other unwritten forms of art communicate differently, and 
sometimes more effectively, than the written or spoken word. Ideas and feelings 
not captured well in words often find effective expression in music or dance. A 
government therefore might discourage or prohibit music or dance because it 
effectively communicates certain ideas that writing and speech do not capture 
well. And indeed, oppressive governments have done precisely this to control 
the populations they ruled.268 
For example, the United States prohibited Indigenous People in the southern 
plains from dancing as part of an effort to transform Indigenous culture so it 
could be assimilated into broader American culture.269 Federal officials 
understood that dance was “profoundly important in the construction and 
negotiation of cultural institutions and the values they represented.”270 Banning 
dance was therefore crucial to the project of erasing Indigenous culture and 
assimilating Indigenous People into mainstream America. The federal 
government targeted dance for suppression because it was a particularly 
effective method of Indigenous self-expression. If Indigenous People could not 
dance, then over time they might forget who they were.271  
In pre-revolution Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini strongly criticized the 
influence of Western culture on Iranian radio and television, which broadcast 
Western-influenced music and Western pop.272 When Khomeini took power 
 
268 Edward Rothstein, Musical Freedom and Why Dictators Fear It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 
1981, § 2, at 1. 
269 Clyde Ellis, “There Is No Doubt . . . the Dances Should Be Curtailed”: Indian Dances 
and Federal Policy on the Southern Plains, 1880-1930, 70 PAC. HIST. REV. 543, 544 (2001); 
Gabriella Treglia, The Consistency and Inconsistency of Cultural Oppression: American 
Indian Dance Bans, 1900-1933, 44 W. HIST. Q. 145, 146 (2013). 
270 Ellis, supra note 269, at 546. 
271 Id. (“Policymakers intended to use the dance bans as part of a far-reaching campaign 
to reconceptualize tribal identities so that they reflected cultural models based on white, 
middle-class, Protestant America.”). 
272 Ameneh Youssefzadeh, The Situation of Music in Iran Since the Revolution: The Role 
of Official Organizations, 9 BRIT. J. ETHNOMUSICOLOGY 35, 36-37 (2000). 
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after the revolution, he imposed a ban on music.273 Although the government 
relaxed this ban after Khomeini’s death,274 the logic behind the ban seems clear. 
The revolutionary government wanted to erase Western influence in order to 
promote what Khomeini considered authentic Iranian culture. Banning music 
would help because the population’s affinity for music would open it to the 
West.  
It is therefore clear that government could use copyright for censorial 
purposes by denying or restricting copyright protection for art forms like music 
or dance. That copyright does not presently embody deliberate censorship is 
beside the point. Content-based regulation receives strict scrutiny not because it 
is censorship but because such regulation could be misused for censorial 
purposes.275 Copyright therefore embodies content-based regulation. 
2. The First Amendment Accepts Copyright’s Content-Based 
Discrimination as Either Government Speech or Government-
Subsidized Speech 
The First Amendment’s hostility towards content-based regulation recognizes 
that, in some cases, government must have the ability to choose between speech 
on the basis of content.276 For example, when government speaks for itself, it 
obviously chooses which speech to promote on the basis of content. Similarly, 
when government funds or subsidizes speech activities, it often chooses which 
speech it subsidizes on the basis of content. 
If ordinary First Amendment rules about content-based regulation applied to 
these situations, the possibility of constitutional paralysis would arise. When the 
U.S. government decided to discourage smoking,277 it clearly adopted a 
viewpoint about the dangers of that activity and spoke accordingly. Requiring 
content neutrality in such endeavors would make no sense because requiring 
government neutrality about pro- and anti-smoking speech would make it 
impossible for government to spread its anti-smoking message effectively. 
First Amendment doctrine therefore exempts government from having to 
abide by ordinary free speech rules in two situations. First, government may 
 
273 Id. at 38 (describing how Khomeini banned concerts, music broadcasts, payment of 
musicians, and music playing; ordered destruction of musical instruments; and declared 
signing any document mentioning music to be a sin). 
274 Id. at 39. 
275 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. Tellingly, copyright has its roots in 
censorship by the British Crown. Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as 
Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 524-26 (1990). 
276 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment: When the Government Must Make 
Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 199, 204-07 (1994). 
277 See Arlen W. Langvardt, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment: Striking the 
Right Balance, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 331, 337-54 (2014); see also Danielle Weatherby 
& Terri R. Day, The Butt Stops Here: The Tobacco Control Act’s Anti-Smoking Regulations 
Run Afoul of the First Amendment, 76 ALB. L. REV. 121, 126-34 (2013). 
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engage in content-based—or even viewpoint-based—discrimination when it 
speaks for itself.278 Second, government has limited authority to engage in 
content-based, but not viewpoint-based, discrimination when it subsidizes the 
speech of others.279 
Of these possibilities, the first offers a poor basis on which to exempt 
copyright from meaningful First Amendment review. The granting of copyright 
does not convert an author’s speech into the government’s speech. However, the 
second offers a plausible rationale for removing copyright from First 
Amendment review because the Supreme Court has allowed the government to 
give financial awards to speakers after examining the content of their speech. 
For our purposes, the most salient case is National Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley,280 in which the Supreme Court upheld legislation that required the 
National Endowment for the Arts (“NEA”) to consider the “general standards of 
decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public” 
when making grant decisions.281 In so ruling, the Court found that the legislation 
was merely hortatory and did not require the NEA to deny grants to particular 
works.282 This lowered the chance that the legislation would have significant 
speech effects.283 Additionally, the Court placed weight on the competitive 
nature of the NEA’s grant-making process.284 The NEA had to examine the 
content of various art projects in order to make funding decisions.285 Thus, in 
the context of competitive grant-making, the government had the authority to 
make funding decisions on the basis of criteria that would be unconstitutional in 
other contexts.  
Finley could be used to exempt copyright from strict First Amendment 
scrutiny. Perhaps giving grant money to artists is the same thing as giving 
copyright incentives to authors, and the government has to make content-based 
choices in order to achieve the objectives behind the subsidy. In copyright’s 
case, that means reserving copyright protection only for works determined by 
Congress to promote the progress of art and, in some cases, limiting protection 
enjoyed by works to ensure such progress.286 This argument has appeal, but it 
ultimately fails because important differences separate the grant program in 
 
278 See Chemerinksy, supra note 276, at 204-06 (noting government must make content-
based decisions about speech when it speaks for itself). 
279 See id. at 206-07 (arguing that government must make content-based choices when 
awarding subsidies). 
280 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
281 Id. at 572 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2018)). 
282 Id. at 580-81. 
283 Id. 
284 Id. at 585 (describing NEA’s finite resources, high volume of applicants, and limited 
number of grants). 
285 Id. at 573-74. 
286 See Snow, supra note 7, at 1490-92 (arguing that Finley’s rationale permits Congress 
to “selectively copyright expression” to promote artistic and scientific progress). 
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Finley from copyright. Ignoring those differences would raise unacceptable risks 
of censorship through copyright and other forms of government regulation. 
The Finley Court accepted the NEA’s grant program in part because the 
hortatory nature of the requirement muted the likelihood of serious speech 
effects.287 Additionally, the context of competitive grant-making implied that 
the government would necessarily make decisions based on the merit of artistic 
content.288 Decency was therefore simply one of many components informing 
the vision of excellence behind the grants.289 This reasoning does not apply well 
to copyright, for copyright’s potential for censorship is significantly larger than 
the NEA’s grant program.  
As an initial matter, copyright’s content-based distinctions are not hortatory. 
They are mandatory. Any censoring potential embodied in those distinctions will 
therefore definitely affect whether copyright claimants get rights and, if they do, 
the shape of those rights. Indeed, the Finley Court strongly suggested that it 
would have ruled differently if the legislation in question expressed mandatory 
requirements for NEA grant-making.290 
Additionally, copyright is not part of a competitive grant-making process in 
which government choices about the merits of art are implied. Copyright instead 
is supposed to encourage all speech, regardless of its merits.291 Applying Finley 
to copyright would give Congress the authority to deny copyright to entire 
classes of works, like violent video games or pornography, for the purpose of 
making them less profitable to produce.292 This would represent the realization 
of copyright’s potential for censorship because every one of these works would 
be at an economic disadvantage to other works that are eligible for copyright 
protection. 
Finally, copyright does not involve a cash subsidy of the sort handed out by 
the NEA. This matters for two reasons. First, the use of cash subsidies means 
that resources are limited. Government must make choices about where to direct 
funding. In some cases, as in Finley, those choices might have to be made on the 
basis of content. By contrast, copyright involves the granting of a marketable 
right, and government can hand out an infinite number of copyrights. This 
eliminates scarcity and weakens the justification for content-based choices. 
 
287 Finley, 524 U.S. at 580-81. 
288 Id. at 586. 
289 Id. at 581-82. 
290 Id. at 581. 
291 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582-83 (1994) (stating that 
quality of purported parody is irrelevant to copyright law); Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903) (holding that judges should not apply 
copyright to assess aesthetic merits of works “outside of the narrowest and most obvious 
limits”). 
292 See Snow, supra note 7, at 1522 (contending that Congress should have power to deny 
selectively copyright to things like violent video games and pornography). 
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Second, extending the government subsidy exception beyond cash or cash-
equivalent grants opens an end run around the general prohibition against 
content-based regulation. Almost any content-based regulation can be recast as 
a subsidy for favored forms of speech. For example, Arkansas claimed that its 
differential taxation for media was a conscious effort to subsidize certain types 
of magazines over others.293 Similarly, the town of Gilbert could have called its 
content-based sign law a conscious subsidy for certain forms of speech that the 
town considered most valuable.294 If any form of subsidy is enough to avoid 
meaningful First Amendment scrutiny, then any government that wants to 
impose content-based regulation will simply draft its law as a non-cash subsidy 
on behalf of favored speech. However, if the government subsidy exception is 
possible only when government actually gives cash to the subsidized speaker, 
abuse of the exception becomes far less likely because government will be 
forced to (literally) put its money where its mouth is.  
3. Government May Employ Content-Based Discrimination in Copyright 
Under the Limited Public Forum Doctrine 
The limited public forum doctrine offers another exception to normal First 
Amendment rules that might allow copyright to escape strict scrutiny. Under this 
doctrine, government may employ reasonable content-based, but not viewpoint-
based, discrimination in forums created by the government for use by certain 
speakers or for discussion of particular subjects.295 Limited public forums differ 
from traditional or designated public forums such as streets or other places where 
the public typically engages in broad speech activity.296 When it comes to public 
forums, ordinary First Amendment principles apply and content-based 
regulation is subject to strict scrutiny.297 With limited public forums, however, 
the government has more leeway. 
Limited public forums typically arise when the government wishes to limit 
use of a facility or a source of funding to a particular purpose.298 Thus, a school 
 
293 See Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232 (1987). 
294 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 159 (2015). 
295 See Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 
(2010); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (plurality opinion); Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983). 
296 See infra notes 306-19 and accompanying text. 
297 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
298 See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 662 (access to law school funding and 
facilities); Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 103 (after hours use of school property); Rosenberger 
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995) (funding of student groups); 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 387-89 (1993) (use of 
school property to show religious films); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 790 (restricted participation 
in charity drive aimed at federal employees); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (access to school teachers’ 
mailboxes). 
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district may have a policy limiting who can use school buildings after hours;299 
a university may set eligibility guidelines for access to student funding;300 or a 
room may be set aside for discussions about a particular topic, such as physics.301 
In all of these cases, the First Amendment allows government to prohibit certain 
speakers from gaining access to the relevant forum on the basis of what the 
speakers will say, as long as the restriction is reasonably related to the forum’s 
purpose. If this were not the case, any speaker could participate in the forum and 
compromise the forum’s utility. This is why content-based discrimination 
reasonably related to the forum’s purpose becomes permissible when the 
government administers a limited public forum.302 
Some have argued that copyright is a limited public forum to which 
government may limit access by engaging in content-based distinction about 
speech.303 The claim portrays copyright’s incentive as a forum-like support 
available only to speech that advances the purpose of the forum—namely the 
creation of more speech. Congress is therefore entitled to exclude non-original 
speech from copyright protection because such speech does not advance 
copyright’s purpose.304 Thus, the rational basis test applies to content-based 
choices that Congress makes about copyrightable subject matter and the scope 
of copyright rights.305 This argument has some appeal, but it stretches the limited 
public forum doctrine in ways that do not make sense. 
Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n306 offers an early and 
important explanation of the principles underlying the limited public forum 
doctrine. In that case, the school district of Perry, Indiana granted access to the 
interschool mail system only to the official collective bargaining representative 
of its teachers, the Perry Education Association (“PEA”).307 All other unions, 
including the Perry Local Educators’ Association (“PLEA”), did not have access 
and therefore could not communicate directly with the teachers.308 PLEA sued 
the school district on the theory that PEA’s preferential access violated the First 
 
299 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-08 (holding that school could limit speakers on 
basis of content of speech, but not on basis of viewpoint); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 392. 
300 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-31. 
301 See id. at 829 (“The necessities of confining a forum to the limited and legitimate 
purposes for which it was created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or for 
the discussion of certain topics.”); see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106. 
302 See supra notes 295, 301; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (recognizing government 
power to preserve property for lawfully dedicated uses). 
303 See, e.g., Snow, supra note 7, at 1488. 
304 See id. at 1489. 
305 Id. 
306 460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
307 Id. at 40. 
308 Id. 
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Amendment.309 PLEA lost in the District Court, succeeded before the Seventh 
Circuit, and ultimately lost in the Supreme Court.310  
In ruling for the defendants, the Court recognized that ordinary First 
Amendment principles might not apply because PLEA sought access to 
government property (i.e., teachers’ mailboxes). The Court wrote: 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech applies to teacher’s 
mailboxes as surely as it does elsewhere within the school and on sidewalks 
outside. But this is not to say that the First Amendment requires equivalent 
access to all parts of a school building in which some form of 
communicative activity occurs. “[N]owhere [have we] suggested that 
students, teachers, or anyone else has an absolute constitutional right to use 
all parts of a school building or its immediate environs for . . . unlimited 
expressive purposes.”311 
The recognition that government could withhold access to some of its 
property implied that the nature of government property would determine the 
extent to which government could limit access for speech purposes. The Court 
then identified three different forms of government property to consider: 
traditional public forums like sidewalks, designated public forums that 
government opens to the public for expressive activity, and all other government 
property.312 For traditional and designated public forums, ordinary First 
Amendment rules would apply.313 This meant that strict scrutiny would apply to 
content-based regulation concerning public forums. However, for all other 
property, different rules would apply.314 In the context of this case, the nonpublic 
nature of the school mailboxes meant that the school district could restrict access 
“on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity” as long as the relevant 
distinctions were “reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum at issue 
serves.”315 
Over time, the Supreme Court refined the reasoning of Perry to recognize two 
kinds of forums in which government would be able to engage in content-based 
restriction of speech: limited public forums and nonpublic forums. Limited 
public forums are those opened by the government exclusively for certain 
speakers or topics.316 Nonpublic forums are those not generally regarded as a 
 
309 Id. at 41. 
310 Id. at 41, 55. 
311 Id. at 44 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972)). 
312 Id. at 45-46. 
313 Id. at 45. 
314 Id. at 46. 
315 Id. at 49. 
316 See supra note 295 (listing cases holding that government may engage in reasonable 
content-based discrimination in government-created forums used by specified speakers or for 
specific subjects). 
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forum for public communication.317 For both, the government may engage in 
content-based, but not viewpoint-based, discrimination to preserve the forum for 
its designated purpose as long as the restriction is reasonably related to the 
forum’s purpose.318 Thus, a school may restrict forums to student speakers, and 
a public body can restrict its public meetings to discussion of official business.319 
The typical limited public forum case involves a claim of access to a 
government building or other physical facility for speech purposes.320 However, 
in Rosenberger, the Supreme Court held that the limited public forum doctrine 
also applied to a “metaphysical” forum that lacked a spatial or geographic 
presence.321 In that case, the University of Virginia had created a Student 
Activities Fund (“SAF”) that subsidized, among other things, expenses for 
“student news, information, opinion, entertainment, or academic 
communications media groups.”322 The SAF guidelines also prevented subsidies 
for, among other things, “religious activities.”323 Controversy erupted when 
Wide Awake Productions (“WAP”), a student organization founded by 
Rosenberger, asked the SAF to cover printing fees for WAP’s newspaper Wide 
Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia.324 The University 
refused, citing its policy against funding religious activity.325 Rosenberger took 
exception and sued, ultimately prevailing before the Supreme Court.326 The 
Court’s decision characterized the SAF as a “metaphysical” forum to which 
limited public forum rules applied.327 The Court then held that the prohibition 
against funding religious activity was not mere content-based regulation, but 
unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination.328 
Rosenberger arguably supports the proposition that limited public forum rules 
apply whenever government creates a program to support speech and 
 
317 See Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (finding public property not traditionally a forum for public 
communication distinguished from other public forums); see also Davenport v. Wash. Educ. 
Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177, 189 (2007); Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 
677-78 (1998) (holding that government may restrict access to nonpublic forum as long as 
restrictions are reasonable and not viewpoint based). 
318 See supra notes 295, 299, 317 and accompanying text (discussing permissible 
government restrictions in public and nonpublic forums). 
319 See City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 
167, 175 n.8 (1976). 
320 See supra note 298 (describing types of places to which plaintiffs sought access in 
limited public forum cases). 
321 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
322 Id. at 824 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 61a, Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 
819 (No. 94-329)). 
323 Id. 
324 Id. at 825. 
325 Id. at 827. 
326 Id. at 827, 845-46. 
327 Id. at 830. 
328 Id. at 830-32. 
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promulgates rules to identify those who get to benefit from that support. Thus, 
as suggested earlier, copyright could be a limited public forum, and government 
may use content-based discrimination to preserve copyright’s purpose of 
promoting art. This argument may be appealing, but there are good reasons to 
reject it. 
As an initial matter, if copyright is a forum at all, it seems better characterized 
as a public forum, not a limited public forum. Under Perry’s framework, two 
kinds of public forums exist: the traditional public forum and the designated 
public forum.329 Traditional public forums are places that have been devoted “by 
long tradition or by government fiat” to assembly and debate.330 These are places 
to which the general public has free access for speech purposes. Designated 
public forums are places opened by the state for public expressive activity.331 
Copyright fits both of these descriptions. Anyone can access the copyright 
system. This distinguishes copyright from the mailboxes of Perry or the student 
activity fund of Rosenberger. In both of those cases, the relevant forums were 
not public, in large part because the state had reserved them for only a very small 
subset of the general population. 
Additionally, the limit that supposedly makes copyright a limited public 
forum does not fit the relevant definition. Under Perry and its progeny, a limited 
public forum exists for use by certain groups or for the discussion of certain 
subjects.332 Copyright’s content-based distinctions are not made on the basis of 
identity or the subject discussed. Original speech does not identify a person or 
group, nor is originality a subject. Instead, originality describes the quality of a 
work. As such, originality cannot be analogized to a subject-matter limit like 
physics or official business. It makes sense to say that a forum is limited to 
discussions of physics or official business. However, that is not how copyright 
works. Copyright does not limit protection to original works so that people who 
get copyright will discuss only original works. Indeed, in some cases, copyright 
reduces protection selectively to some original works, but not others.333 
Finally, it is important to heed the foregoing distinctions to keep the limited 
public forum doctrine within proper boundaries. The basic orientation of the 
First Amendment is the application of strict scrutiny to content-based regulation. 
The limited public forum doctrine is an exception to this practice that recognizes 
the government’s need to manage its own property and operations. If courts 
begin to characterize general legislation that selectively subsidizes speech as a 
limited public forum, the result will be invalidation of many precedents applying 
strict scrutiny to content-based regulation. After all, the differential tax system 
 
329 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
330 Id. at 45. 
331 Id. at 45-46. 
332 See supra notes 295-319 and accompanying text (explaining characteristics of and 
restrictions on speech in limited public forums). 
333 See supra Part I (describing how copyright makes distinctions between original works 
on the basis of their content). 
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in Arkansas Writers’ Project could become a limited public forum created for 
the purpose of improving the diversity of print publications. Perhaps the town of 
Gilbert created a new limited public forum designed to promote certain signs 
because they contribute more to an informed citizenry. Granted, these content-
based regulations were viewpoint neutral. The government passed them with no 
desire to help one viewpoint over others. But the Supreme Court struck these 
laws down because content-based regulation carries a generally unacceptable 
risk of censorship.334 It therefore makes little sense to have a basic rule against 
content-based regulation only to have it easily circumvented. Indeed, in 
copyright’s case, it is important to remember that copyright itself was once used 
as a form of censorship in England335 and that it would be only too easy to amend 
copyright law to hinder a disfavored form of expression under the guise of 
promoting the progress of art. For example, Congress might define 
copyrightable subject matter to exclude sexually explicit (but not obscene) 
works on the theory that they do not contribute to the progress of art.336 Or 
perhaps a future Congress might conclude that film depictions of teen drug use 
retard the progress of art. If, as application of the limited public forum doctrine 
would imply, the rational basis test were used to review such enactments, they 
would almost certainly be found constitutional. Such a result permits the state to 
impose censorship, and this is exactly what elevated First Amendment scrutiny 
is meant to forestall. 
C. The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny 
So far, we have seen that case law does not neatly prescribe the level of 
scrutiny to be applied by the First Amendment to copyright’s content-based 
provisions. Under Eldred and Golan, content-neutral portions of the Copyright 
Act seem likely to receive rational basis scrutiny.337 Tam and Brunetti surely 
establish that any viewpoint-based aspects of copyright will be presumptively 
unconstitutional under some form of strict scrutiny.338 The treatment of 
copyright’s content-based provisions is, however, much less clear. Eldred and 
Golan could be extended to cover these laws, but the logic of those cases does 
not fit well.339 Other cases strongly suggest that copyright’s content-based 
provisions should receive strict scrutiny,340 but accepting this would probably 
 
334 See supra note 138 and accompanying text (arguing that “the vice” of content-based 
restriction lies in its censorship potential). 
335 See Yen, supra note 275, at 524-26. 
336 See Ann Bartow, Copyright Law and Pornography, 91 OR. L. REV. 1, 34-47 (2012) 
(advocating for denial of copyright to non-progressive and non-useful pornographic works in 
order to decrease their economic viability). 
337 See supra Section IV.A. 
338 See supra Part II (discussing Tam, Brunetti, and claimant-side challenges to copyright 
in depth). 
339 See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text. 
340 See supra Section IV.B. 
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cause mass invalidation of basic copyright provisions and upset the stability of 
creative industries that depend on copyright.341 
This problem bears resemblance to the one that has given rise to the 
commercial speech doctrine and the concomitant application of intermediate 
scrutiny to the content-based regulation of commercial speech. On one hand, 
First Amendment law rightly treats content-based regulation with suspicion in 
order to prevent censorship. On the other hand, legislatures need flexibility to 
regulate commerce, and commerce frequently involves speech. The commercial 
speech doctrine strikes a compromise position between the poles of strict and 
rational basis scrutiny. Intermediate scrutiny gives courts the ability to make sure 
that there are good reasons for content-based regulation of commercial speech 
without destroying legislative power to regulate commerce.  
The same can be said for copyright. On one hand, copyright regulates speech, 
so content-based regulation in copyright is cause for some concern about 
censorship. On the other hand, copyright is also commercial regulation that 
creates markets for the sale of copyright rights. Congress may need to make 
distinctions between different types of works or speech in order to fine tune 
copyright’s incentives. Using intermediate scrutiny to review copyright’s 
content-based provisions would therefore strike a compromise position similar 
to the one held by the commercial speech doctrine. 
The relationship between Article I of the U.S. Constitution and the First 
Amendment supports this possibility. Article I specifically authorizes Congress 
to enact copyright legislation,342 while the First Amendment limits the powers 
given to Congress in Article I by depriving Congress of the ability to enact laws 
abridging the freedom of speech.343 It is of course possible to interpret the First 
Amendment as applying strict scrutiny to all content-based regulation, including 
copyright. But there is reason to doubt whether this makes sense because Article 
I’s specific authorization to pass copyright legislation, the enactment of the first 
copyright act, and the subsequent ratification of the First Amendment say 
something about how the Constitution balances the tension between copyright 
and freedom of speech. 
When Congress enacted the first copyright act in 1790, it extended copyright 
only to any “map, chart, book or books.”344 A year later, in 1791, the United 
States ratified the First Amendment.345 One could read the ratification of the 
First Amendment as the presumptive invalidation of the first copyright act 
because the first copyright act implemented content-based regulation with its 
limitation to maps, charts, and books. However, such a conclusion seems shaky 
 
341 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
342 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
343 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
344 Copyright Act of 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124. 
345 See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). 
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because the act continued in full force and effect without constitutional 
challenge. This does not mean that the Constitution permits Congress to use 
copyright as a tool of censorship. However, it implies that the Constitution 
accepts some risk of restricted free speech in exchange for copyright’s benefits. 
The Supreme Court endorsed this line of thinking in Eldred. In that case, 
Justice Ginsburg wrote: “The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were 
adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers’ view, 
copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles.”346 
Thus, if the First Amendment accepts copyright because the Constitution had 
already authorized a copyright statute containing content-based regulation, that 
acceptance must include tolerance for some level of content-based 
discrimination within copyright. This does not necessarily mean that courts 
should apply the rational basis test to content-based regulation in copyright. It 
means only that the level of First Amendment scrutiny needs to be lenient 
enough to allow content-based discrimination at the level of “maps, charts, book 
or books” while also being rigorous enough to prevent inadvertent censorship. 
The use of intermediate scrutiny accomplishes this. 
To see this, consider how a three-tiered approach to the First Amendment 
review of copyright implements an appropriate balance between copyright’s 
benefits and the risk of censorship. The highest level of review applies to 
portions of copyright that carry the greatest and most immediate threat of 
censorship. Accordingly, any viewpoint-based portions of the Copyright Act 
would be presumptively unconstitutional because such regulation effectively 
constitutes censorship. Such a result would be consistent with Tam and Brunetti. 
A moderate level of review applies to copyright legislation that risks, but does 
not immediately create, censorship. This would be the case with most content-
based copyright legislation because such legislation varies the protection given 
to works based upon content, but not for the purpose of favoring one set of ideas 
over another. These portions of the Copyright Act bear resemblance to the sign 
restrictions found in Reed, where the town treated signs differently on the basis 
of content but not because the town wanted to help or discourage particular 
messages. In Reed, the Supreme Court expressed great worry about the 
possibility of censorship and therefore applied strict scrutiny.347 By contrast, 
such worry would be muted for copyright given its constitutional compatibility 
with the First Amendment. This implies that courts should use intermediate 
scrutiny to examine content-based copyright legislation. 
Finally, as long as Congress and the courts maintain the “traditional contours” 
of copyright, rational basis review makes sense for copyright’s content-neutral 
provisions. These laws pose little risk of censorship, and the appropriate 
implementation of doctrines like the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use 
generally keep copyright from becoming an unduly burdensome drag on speech. 
 
346 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
347 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
  
1260 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:1215 
Rational basis review therefore applies to things like the duration of 
copyright;348 termination and transfer;349 damages recoverable in copyright;350 
and existing rights of reproduction, derivative works, and distribution currently 
enjoyed by copyright holders.351 However, if copyright’s traditional contours 
should change, whether by legislative enactment or judicial interpretation, then 
intermediate scrutiny should apply to copyright’s content-neutral provisions. 
This is consistent with Eldred and Golan.352 
V. THE CONSEQUENCES 
We are now in a position to see how the suggested multi-tier system for First 
Amendment copyright review might work.  
A. Provisions Subject to Strict Scrutiny as Viewpoint-Based Discrimination 
A few provisions of the existing Copyright Act engage in viewpoint-based 
discrimination. Courts should therefore apply strict scrutiny, rendering them 
presumptively unconstitutional. 
1. Section 110(3) and Works “of a [R]eligious [N]ature” 
Section 110(3) provides our first example of viewpoint-based discrimination 
in copyright. That provision singles out nondramatic literary, musical, and 
dramatico-musical works “of a religious nature” for disfavored treatment by 
denying them performance royalties at religious services.353 One might initially 
think that such singling out is ordinary content-based discrimination. However, 
the Supreme Court has taken the view that disfavoring speech because of its 
religious nature is viewpoint discrimination subject to strict scrutiny.354  
2. Fair Use and Discrimination in Favor of Works Expressing Critical 
Viewpoints  
Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides a second example of viewpoint-
based discrimination in copyright. That section codifies the fair use doctrine, 
excusing what would otherwise be infringement if the alleged infringing work 
meets the codified test.355 A considerable amount of the fair use provision 
 
348 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (2018). 
349 See id. §§ 203-205, 304(c). 
350 See id. §§ 502-505. 
351 See id. § 106(1)-(3). 
352 See supra notes 179-99 and accompanying text. 
353 17 U.S.C. § 110(3). 
354 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 832 (1995) 
(holding that university’s refusal to pay expenses of religious newspaper is viewpoint 
discrimination). 
355 17 U.S.C. § 107 (prescribing test for fair use of copyrighted material that requires 
considering: (1) purpose and character of use; (2) nature of copyrighted materials; (3) portion 
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embodies ordinary content-based regulation, and those provisions would not be 
subject to strict scrutiny. However, one part of the fair use test clearly applies 
viewpoint-based discrimination. 
The preamble of § 107 identifies a number of favored uses that are particularly 
good candidates for fair use. One of these uses is criticism, and courts have used 
this language to give works embodying critical perspectives more generous fair 
use treatment than those that do not.356 The principal subjects of this distinction 
are new works that incorporate or use a prior copyrighted work in recognizable 
form. Examples include adaptations of songs for comic effect,357 the work of 
appropriation artists,358 and derivative adaptations of copyrighted novels.359 
Courts are generally much more likely to give these works fair use treatment if 
they criticize the copyrighted original. For example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc.,360 the Supreme Court considered whether the rap group 2 Live 
Crew’s humorous adaptation of Roy Orbison’s “Pretty Woman” was an 
infringing derivative work or was a non-infringing fair use.361 The Sixth Circuit 
had found the work infringing,362 but the Supreme Court reversed, in large part 
because it perceived that 2 Live Crew’s work criticized the Orbison original.363  
This aspect of the fair use doctrine has implications for free speech. Those 
who humorously adapt a work get better treatment if their work adopts a critical 
viewpoint on the copyrighted original.364 This means that creation and 
distribution of a humorous work that does not clearly criticize the original runs 
a particularly high risk of being declared illegal.365 Those creating it may 
 
of copyrighted material used as compared to its whole; and (4) effect of use upon market for 
or value of copyrighted material). 
356 See id. 
357 See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1986). 
358 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992) (weighing lack of criticism of 
copyrighted material heavily in rejecting fair use defense). 
359 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(finding fair use because of critical aspects of defendant’s retelling of novel Gone with the 
Wind). 
360 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
361 Id. at 571-72. 
362 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1439 (6th Cir. 1992). 
363 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581-83. Numerous lower court cases follow Campbell’s 
analysis. See Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc., v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142-43 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (“[W]e find scant reason to conclude that this trivia quiz book seeks to educate, 
criticize, parody, comment, report upon, or research Seinfeld . . . .”); Leibovitz v. Paramount 
Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1998) (weighing critical elements of parody 
heavily in finding work worthy of fair use treatment); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin 
Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding defendant’s work not 
entitled to fair use because it was insufficiently critical of plaintiff’s work to be parody). 
364 See supra note 363. 
365 See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2018). The Copyright Act permits courts to grant injunctions 
against the distribution or sale of infringing works. Id. Thus, as a practical matter, the author 
of a derivative work deemed infringing owns nothing of value. See id. 
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become subject to injunctions against their work and would be unable to claim 
copyright for it, even if their work is highly creative.366 Copyright literally 
prefers one kind of humorous derivative work over another, incentivizing the 
creation of critical ones while outlawing the merely humorous ones. 
Under the framework suggested here, this distinction in fair use should be 
unconstitutional. If, subject to other fair use requirements, critical works get fair 
use treatment, it seems that there is no compelling reason for government to 
exclude non-critical works from being treated the same way. One might argue 
that government must treat non-critical works as infringing in order to preserve 
copyright incentives. However, it is unlikely that the elimination of criticism as 
a factor in fair use determinations will significantly undermine copyright 
incentives because courts are free to interpret viewpoint-neutral and content-
neutral aspects of the Copyright Act to create appropriate limits for fair use. For 
example, the statute mentions commentary, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, and research as good candidates for fair use.367 Courts could (and 
do) give less generous fair use treatment to works that do not reflect these 
purposes, making sure that fair use does not unduly undermine copyright 
incentives. Similarly, to the extent that fair use treatment depends on the amount 
and significance of any borrowing from the copyrighted work,368 courts could 
appropriately limit fair use by scrutinizing whether a defendant’s legitimate 
purposes justify the amount borrowed.369 
 
366 See id. § 103(b). This provision extends copyright only to the portions of derivative 
works contributed by the author. Id. By implication, a work deemed infringing is not original 
to its author and cannot be protected by copyright. See id. 
367 See id. § 107. 
368 See id. § 107(3). 
369 Other commentators have advocated for giving works that do not criticize the 
copyrighted original more generous fair use treatment than they presently receive. See 
Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright: 
Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 924 (1985) (arguing for use of traditional 
tort developed under First Amendment doctrine and for rejection of “disguised tort of ‘satiric 
appropriation’”); Tyler T. Ochoa, Dr. Seuss, the Juice and Fair Use: How the Grinch Silenced 
a Parody, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 546, 547-48 (1998) (arguing against result in Dr. 
Seuss Enterprises, claiming that publication should have been held to be parody meriting fair 
use treatment); Roger L. Zissu, Expanding Fair Use: The Trouble with Parody, the Case for 
Satire, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 165, 167 (2017) (arguing for each copyright 
infringement case to be taken on its own facts without consideration of any overarching rule); 
Annemarie Bridy, Note, Sheep in Goats’ Clothing: Satire and Fair Use After Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 257, 258-59 (2004) (arguing for 
distinction between satirical parody, which would not merit fair use protection, and indirectly 
satirical parody, which would merit fair use protection). 
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B. Provisions of the Copyright Act Subject to Intermediate Scrutiny as 
Ordinary Content-Based Regulation 
Some, but not all, of copyright’s content-based (but not viewpoint-based) 
provisions would survive intermediate scrutiny. To see this, let us classify 
copyright’s content-based provisions into three groups. The first contains 
doctrines closely associated with copyright’s fundamental concepts. These will 
pass First Amendment scrutiny fairly easily. The second represents legislation 
crafted to achieve government objectives. These will often be found 
constitutional, but the outcome will not always be clear. The third embodies 
simple economic preferences enacted to favor one group over others. These will 
rarely be found constitutional because they do not serve an important 
governmental purpose. 
1. Content-Based Provisions Closely Related to Copyright’s Fundamental 
Concepts 
Content-based provisions closely related to copyright’s fundamental concepts 
are highly likely to survive intermediate scrutiny because the Supreme Court has 
already recognized how these doctrines serve an important governmental 
purpose. For example, consider § 102(a), which grants copyright only to 
“original works of authorship.”370 A statute fails intermediate scrutiny unless it 
furthers an important government interest and does so by means substantially 
related to that interest.371 The § 102(a) restriction to original works passes this 
test comfortably. As an initial matter, the purpose served by the originality 
requirement is the promotion of art. This is an important government interest 
enshrined in the Constitution as the justification for copyright’s existence.372 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has explained that originality is precisely how 
copyright advances its constitutional purpose. For example, in Feist, the Court 
recognized that it might seem unfair to deny protection to unoriginal features of 
works that still required great labor to create, but it affirmed that denial by 
explaining that such unfairness advanced copyright’s constitutional purpose.373 
The Court wrote: 
 It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be 
used by others without compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly 
observed, however, this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory 
scheme.” It is, rather, “the essence of copyright,” and a constitutional 
requirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor 
of authors, but “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” To 
this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but 
 
370 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
371 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017) (defining intermediate 
scrutiny test in First Amendment context). 
372 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
373 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991). 
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encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed 
by a work. This principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression 
dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. As applied to a factual 
compilation, assuming the absence of original written expression, only the 
compiler’s selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may 
be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the 
means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.374 
The foregoing shows that § 102(a) furthers an important government interest 
by means substantially related to that interest. A similar conclusion would follow 
with respect to the fair use doctrine’s differential treatment for factually based 
works. The Eldred Court identified fair use as one of copyright’s traditional 
contours that makes copyright compatible with the First Amendment.375 Liberal 
borrowing from factually based works promotes the dissemination of facts, 
which is an important government interest. The means for furthering that interest 
are substantially related to the interest itself. Facts are most often found in 
publications, and the government may want certain facts to be known broadly. 
This implies that those disseminating facts must be allowed to borrow relatively 
liberally from works that contain facts. To do otherwise would force people to 
duplicate efforts made by those who collect facts or create factually based works. 
This would be wasteful and inefficient. 
2. Provisions that Serve Important Government Objectives 
Compulsory licensing offers a good example of a Copyright Act provision 
that probably withstands intermediate scrutiny, even though it does not embody 
a basic copyright concept. The § 115(a) compulsory license for the making of 
phonorecords exists because government wanted to promote the development of 
technology that mechanically reproduced music, which is (especially in 
hindsight) an important government interest. Section 115(a) originally appeared 
as part of the Copyright Act of 1909.376 At the time, Congress confronted the 
issue of how copyright applied to player piano rolls, which enabled music to be 
mechanically “played” on a piano. Congress specifically worried that copyright 
 
374 Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
471 U.S. 539, 589 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); then quoting id.; and then quoting U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
375 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 196-97 (2003). 
376 See Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong. 5-6 (2004) (statement of Hon. Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, 
Copyright Office of the United States, Library of Congress) (recounting history of compulsory 
license in 1909 Act); see also Howard B. Abrams, Copyright’s First Compulsory License, 26 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 215, 215-17 (2010). 
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holders might combine to create a monopoly over recorded music.377 Congress 
therefore used the compulsory license to forestall the monopoly.378  
Over time, the importance of piano player rolls faded as phonograph 
technology rose. Nevertheless, the compulsory license has had the effect that 
Congress intended by guaranteeing the recording industry an ample supply of 
raw material (i.e., musical works) to record. The relative vibrancy of America’s 
recorded music industry379 and its great contributions to the progress of art since 
the enactment of the compulsory license support the importance and value of 
this provision, making it well matched to promotion of the governmental 
objective.  
One might further argue that the original justification for the law no longer 
exists. Perhaps the recording industry benefitted from special government action 
to flourish in its infancy. Now, nearly one hundred years later, it is doubtful that 
the industry still needs a government-imposed compulsory license in order to 
flourish.380 Indeed, most recorded music licenses are now obtained through the 
Harry Fox Agency,381 a privately held corporation that offers a more streamlined 
licensing process than the one prescribed by the Copyright Act.382 This might 
persuade a court that the § 115 compulsory license no longer directly serves an 
important government interest, placing the compulsory license in mild 
constitutional jeopardy. That having been said, it is probably more likely that 
courts will not upset the compulsory license because the music industry has 
worked with and around it for so long that its removal would introduce 
significant commercial uncertainty.383  
 
377 See Abrams, supra note 376, at 217-21; see also Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Remington 
Records, Inc., 265 F.2d 263, 269 (2d Cir. 1959). 
378 See Abrams, supra note 376, at 220-21. 
379 See generally RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., RIAA 2018 YEAR-END MUSIC 
INDUSTRY REVENUE REPORT (2018), https://www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02 
/RIAA-2018-Year-End-Music-Industry-Revenue-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9SA-2B74] 
(reporting retail revenues for U.S. recorded music industry of $9.8 billion and streaming 
revenues of $7.4 billion in 2018). 
380 See Abrams, supra note 376, at 221-25. 
381 See THE HARRY FOX AGENCY, https://www.harryfox.com/#/ [https://perma.cc/VWU2-
3ZMT] (last visited August 12, 2020). 
382 See Abrams, supra note 376, at 238-39 (reporting that Harry Fox Agency issued over 
2.44 million licenses in 2008 as compared to 274 attempts to invoke compulsory license). 
383 See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1975 REVISION BILL 
OCTOBER–DECEMBER 1975 ch. IX, at 36 (1975). Despite good arguments in favor of repealing 
the compulsory license, Congress decided not to do so in large part because sentiment in the 
recording industry towards repeal was moderate at best. See id. at 6-8. Record companies 
obviously wanted to see the license continued, but some copyright owners also did not favor 
repeal. See id. (describing controversy about proposed repeal of compulsory license and 
support for license from surprisingly broad cross section of music industry). 
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3. Copyright Provisions Embodying Giveaways 
Content-based copyright provisions that act as naked preferences favoring 
some over others should be declared unconstitutional fairly quickly. This is 
because such provisions do not serve important governmental interests of the 
sort sufficient to withstand intermediate constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, when 
content-based regulation exists without strong and apparent justification, it 
becomes quite possible—if not likely—that the associated discrimination exists 
because a politically powerful interest has successfully lobbied Congress for a 
special privilege. In ordinary contexts, political horse trading may be perfectly 
normal and acceptable. And indeed, application of the rational basis test 
generally upholds the constitutionality of such provisions. When such favors 
require constitutionally suspect discrimination on the basis of speech, however, 
such easy acceptance no longer makes sense. Congress should not be permitted 
to trade away constitutional rights as political favors, and intermediate scrutiny 
prevents the most troubling of such abuses. 
The § 106 limitation of public performance rights that discriminates against 
recording artists offers a good example of the kind of copyright content-based 
discrimination that should fail intermediate scrutiny.384 Unlike songwriters or 
composers, who receive a royalty for over-the-air broadcasts of their songs, 
recording artists receive nothing for broadcasts of their recorded 
performances.385 One might hypothesize that this distinction exists to subsidize 
AM and FM radio broadcasters who would otherwise go out of business, thereby 
harming the public interest. However, accepting this hypothesis does not explain 
why only recording artists bear the costs of the subsidy. Indeed, recording artists 
do not have to subsidize digital broadcasters in the same way, making questions 
about the justification for this distinction even more urgent.386 
The history behind this provision suggests that the real explanation for this 
seeming anomaly is the simple exercise of naked political power. When radio 
stations first began broadcasting live music in the early part of the twentieth 
century, it was not clear that the stations infringed copyright in songs by doing 
so.387 Over time, copyright holders in songs prevailed in court, paving the way 
for the payment of performance royalties to music copyright holders by radio 
stations.388 However, when radio stations began broadcasting recorded (as 
opposed to live) music, the recording industry did not have the same success in 
forcing radio stations to pay, in part because the Copyright Act did not protect 
 
384 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
385 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
386 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2018). 
387 See Bruce H. Phillips & Carl R. Moore, Digital Performance Royalties: Should Radio 
Pay?, 3 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 169, 170 (2001). 
388 See id. at 170-71 (describing litigation success of American Society of Composers, 
Authors, and Publishers in defending rights of music copyright holders against radio 
broadcasters). 
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sound recordings at the time.389 The enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act 
changed the law, but not entirely in favor of the recording industry. In particular, 
the 1976 Act protected sound recordings, but it conspicuously omitted any right 
of public performance for sound recordings.390 This meant that radio 
broadcasters still owed no royalties to those whose performances were 
broadcast. 
Tellingly, the original draft of the 1976 Act granted public performance rights 
to sound recordings, but vigorous lobbying by the broadcasting industry blocked 
the provision from becoming law.391 And, to add salt to the wound, the 
Copyright Office soon issued a report criticizing this denial of performance 
rights as indefensible.392 Despite this, the National Association of Broadcasters 
has continued to block attempts to end discrimination against copyright holders 
in recorded music.393 Indeed, one analysis suggests that the outsized influence 
of broadcasters stems from “the political reality . . . that all members of 
Congress have radio stations in their district, and all members of Congress seek 
the goodwill of many of those radio stations, especially when they run for re-
election.”394 
A similar conclusion should apply to the § 110(4), (6), and (10) provisions 
that subsidize nonprofits, religious organizations, agricultural and horticultural 
fairs, and veterans’ or fraternal organizations by excusing them from paying 
royalties to copyright holders of certain musical and nondramatic literary 
works.395 Such distinctions would probably pass rational basis scrutiny, as nearly 
all legislation does. However, the likelihood of their surviving intermediate 
scrutiny is rather low. It is unclear why it is important for government to 
subsidize these groups and not others who might be equally deserving. And even 
 
389 See id. at 171. 
390 See id. Technically, sound recordings gained copyright protection in the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971, with that protection codified in the 1976 Act. See Sound Recording 
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 114); 
Steven J. D’Onofrio, In Support of Performance Rights in Sound Recordings, 29 UCLA L. 
REV. 168, 169 (1981). 
391 See S. 1111, 94th Cong. § 2(3) (1975); Steve Gordon & Anjana Puri, The Current State 
of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: Recent Federal Court Decisions in California and New York 
Against Sirius XM Have Broader Implications Than Just Whether Satellite and Internet Radio 
Stations Must Pay for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 336, 
341 (2015). 
392 See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, PERFORMANCE RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 22-046, at 24-26 (2d Sess. 1978). 
393 See Matthew S. DelNero, Long Overdue? An Exploration of the Status and Merit of a 
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once one identifies an important governmental interest being served, there is no 
rationale that justifies placing the entire burden of the subsidy on certain 
enumerated categories of speech while allowing other forms of expression to 
escape. This does not mean that Congress cannot subsidize certain users or uses 
of copyrighted works. As an example, Congress could, as a matter of the First 
Amendment, exempt agricultural and horticultural fairs from paying public 
performance licenses, but the legislation probably needs to be content neutral. 
C. Content-Neutral Provisions Subject to Rational Basis Scrutiny 
Consistent with Eldred and Golan, copyright’s content-neutral provisions 
receive only rational basis scrutiny. These provisions include many of 
copyright’s most important features. For example, the Copyright Act defines 
exclusive rights concerning reproduction, creation of derivative works, and 
distribution without relying upon the content of speech.396 The rules governing 
duration of copyright apply equally to all types of copyrighted works.397 And the 
statutory provisions governing infringement and remedies do not refer to the 
content of the copyright holder’s work.398 Because rational basis scrutiny almost 
never results in a finding of unconstitutionality, copyright’s content-neutral 
provisions will surely remain unchanged if made subject to a First Amendment 
challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright’s effects on speech imply that the First Amendment should limit 
the kind of copyright legislation that Congress can pass. However, courts have 
largely refrained from articulating those limits, treating copyright more as 
commercial regulation that requires only rational basis scrutiny. Although some 
commentators have decried this, rational basis First Amendment review of 
copyright has largely become the accepted state of affairs. 
Cases like Tam and Brunetti constructively disrupt this status quo. By drawing 
attention to the various types of speech regulations found in copyright, they help 
us see how intermediate and strict First Amendment scrutiny should apply to 
some of copyright’s existing features. Although few in number, copyright’s 
viewpoint-based features should receive strict First Amendment scrutiny and 
would likely be found unconstitutional. 
Courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to copyright’s content-based 
provisions. This would result in the invalidation of only parts of the current 
Copyright Act. Basic doctrines like originality and fair use pass constitutional 
muster because they play a central role in copyright’s encouragement of speech. 
The Constitution recognizes this as the justification for copyright, and the 
Supreme Court has stated that these doctrines are precisely how copyright 
accomplishes its constitutional purpose.  
 
396 See id. § 106(1)-(3). 
397 See id. §§ 302-305. 
398 See id. §§ 501-505. 
  
2020] RETHINKING COPYRIGHT’S RELATIONSHIP 1269 
Other doctrines, like the compulsory license for recorded music, do not pass 
intermediate scrutiny because they closely serve copyright’s constitutional 
purposes. Instead, they survive because they directly advance important public 
objectives, like the promotion of recording technologies. To the extent that the 
initial justification for such provisions has diminished, they may stand on shakier 
constitutional footing today than they did when initially passed. However, I 
doubt that a court would strike them down on First Amendment grounds at this 
time. 
Finally, a number of copyright provisions would not pass intermediate 
scrutiny, largely because they do not advance important governmental interests. 
Instead, these provisions function as naked preferences that favor one set of 
economic interests over others. Indeed, some of these provisions persist in the 
Copyright Act simply because influential parties lobbied for them and oppose 
attempts at reform. 
Some may object that these constitutional limits unduly hamper Congress’s 
ability to strike legislative bargains within copyright law. There is some merit to 
this concern. Legislation generally embodies tradeoffs, and copyright is no 
different. Constraining Congress’s ability to strike bargains could make it harder 
for Congress to pass copyright legislation. However, First Amendment scrutiny 
exists to make sure that Congress has genuinely good reasons to pass legislation 
affecting speech, especially when such legislation risks censorship. Giveaways 
and tradeoffs may facilitate legislative compromise, but they should not be 
implemented with no regard for important constitutional values. Constitutional 
constraints associated with meaningful First Amendment review will therefore 
improve copyright by eliminating unjustified content-based distinctions that 
improperly advantage some speakers over others. Results like these may be 
controversial to some, but they should be regarded as salutary for a statute whose 
purpose is the evenhanded promotion of speech. 
 
 
